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One week before I took my first steps onto Peruvian soil, my first onto the continent of 
South America, Lori Berenson was granted a conditional release after serving 15 years in 
Peruvian prison for her unlawful association with the terrorist group the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru. The outspoken brunette from New York was 26 years old 
when she was delivered a life sentence from Peru’s military tribunal. In June of 2010, I 
was also 26, reeling from my first year of graduate school. 
 
It was in the summer of 2010, in the thralls of metropolitan Lima, that I began to pursue 
nebulous interests that would eventually form this thesis. After two weeks of meetings 
and interviews, I would head due north out of Lima on the Panamericana towards the 
arid coastal region of La Libertad. In the city of Chao, at the heart of the northern 
agroindustry, sand blew in every direction. It stuck to the lips of children as they ate their 
ice cream, blew into the eyes of workers as they bent to harvest ripe asparagus, and 
invaded the office of the city manager who appeared to be losing a long and unwinnable 
game against Mother Nature.  
 
That summer, the country of Peru captivated all of my senses and became a land of 
enchantment with which I would happily engage in a research-in-love affair that would 
last for more than two years. Of all the people who helped me along the way – my initial 
contacts at CEPES, the women at Aurora Vivar, and the lawyers who would help me 
make sense of a foreign context – no group was more central to the production of this 
study than the workers that occupy the plantations of La Libertad. Their humility, 
graciousness, and commitment to challenging hierarchies of power and capital in the 
name of future generations will live with me as I move beyond graduate school. Without 
their generous treatment of my requests, this study would never have been possible. 
 
Sincere gratitude is due to the many professors who held my hand through murky waters 
and pushed me into deeper water when I got too close to shore. I thank Ariel Dulitzky for 
his calm and thoughtful guidance in this process and for acting as a continual source of 
inspiration. The wisdom of Tracy Dahlby, who has acted as a mentor, guru, and master 
editor over these past three years, has been invaluable to my development as a journalist 
and storyteller. I thank Greg Knapp for his pragmatism, clear mind, and good faith efforts 
in keeping me as his TA and advisee over the past two years.  
 
Thank you to my family, who has accepted poor Skype connections, infrequent visits, 
and unsolicited diatribes on globalization in exchange for unconditional love and support. 
My curiosity in the world and compassion for others come from you more than anyone 
else. And thank you to Danielle and Pamela for karate kicks, mariachi dancing, and 
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The liberalizing economic reforms that began under Fujimori in the 1990s have had a 
profound impact on primary production processes throughout the country of Peru. In the 
northern coastal region of La Libertad, such reforms have rearranged the physical 
landscape for the cultivation of nontraditional exports and have as a result altered internal 
migration mechanisms that provide abundant and cheap labor to domestic and 
multinational corporations operating on the coast. The downward pressures on labor have 
been acute as Peru competes for investment on a global scale with other developing 
countries. Organized resistance in response to poor working conditions and an inadequate 
regulatory framework has made few tangible gains over the years despite widespread 
discontent among agribusiness workers. Looking at the macro-level economic framework 
and national legislation, ethnic divisions of labor and task specification, as well as 
internal corporate practices that dissuade union affiliation, this study will examine the 
factors that have limited union organizing in northern Peruvian agribusiness the role of 
corporations, specifically that of Camposol, in community and regional development. 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Methodology 
As a region, Latin America began looking to the global market in hopes of 
stabilizing large debt payments and spurring economic growth throughout the 1990s. In 
recent years, nontraditional exports1 have become the centerpiece of export-oriented 
strategies, with some bodies of research using the term synonymously with a larger set of 
economic reforms intended to correct the imbalances that led to debt in the first place – 
namely, those associated with import-substitution strategies.2 While studies have shown 
the economic growth potential of nontraditional commodities to be high in the short term, 
questions remain as to how a nontraditional export-centered economy will affect the 
long-term development potential of Latin America and, in this case, the country of Peru.3 
In this section, I will briefly outline some of the authors and lines of thought that 
served to theoretically frame and guide my research. I will then discuss how this study 
fits among those bodies of work before moving on to a description of the methodology I 
employed in the field.  
 The transformation of the Peruvian rural sector has occurred over the past four 
decades, spurred at its onset by the agrarian reform officially begun in 1969 as a project 
of the Military Junta. Peruvian elites found peasant uprisings and consequent land reform 
to be a poor answer to the country’s lack of productive capacity, turning instead to 
modernization as a strategy for economic development. The haciendas of the landed elite 
would eventually become the predecessors to the modern Peruvian plantation depicted in 
this study. In La Libertad, a northern coastal region long known for its fertile soil and 
                                                 
1 Nontraditional exports have been used, according to Barham et. al, as a term that comprises three distinct processes: First, an export 
can be described as nontraditional because it has not been grown in a country before. Second, the term can refer to a product that used 
to be grown for domestic consumption and is now grown, primarily, for export. The third use of the term is used with reference to the 
development of a new market for a traditional product, such as a country that has not previously bought the product. 
2 Bradford Barham et al., “Nontraditional Agricultural Exports in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 27, no. 2 
(January 1, 1992): 43–82. 
3 Ibid. 
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agricultural production, the shift towards nontraditional exports and the modernization of 
haciendas began on the region’s vast sugar estates. As was the case throughout Latin 
America, a combination of fertilizers and pesticides, the advent of irrigation systems, and 
the vertical integration of production processes led to a rapid increase in productivity. 
The so-called Green Revolution had the effect of increasing total hectares under 
production, re-concentrating fertile land in relatively few powerful hangs, and displacing 
peasants from land acquired during agrarian reform. Over time, this land has been slowly 
transferred to private investors. As Feder (1977) points out, in these years the rural elite 
became the commercial elite.4 
With the advancements of the Green Revolution came greater efficiency of both 
land and labor. The growing interdependence between agriculture and industry, which 
acquired the label ‘agribusiness,’ an endeavor that in La Libertad – and throughout Latin 
America – came to be largely dominated by foreign investors and large multinational 
corporations (MNCs) – the neo-latifundistas. This has created a twist on the classic 
conflict between the rural proletariat and the landed elite, as the commercial elite “has an 
increasingly broader international connotation. Rural labour is not facing just a powerful 
class enemy anymore, but transnational investors and corporations whose political and 
economic power is infinitely greater than the former.”5 
The increasing presence of agribusiness has had two notable effects on rural 
populations. Many small-scale farmers have entered into contracts with agribusinesses, 
leasing their land for production and becoming economically dependent on agribusiness 
as a result. The second effect, and the one that will a central focus of this study, is the 
separation of the rural peasantry from their own means of production and a massive 
                                                 
4 Ernest Feder, “Agribusiness and the Elimination of Latin America’s Rural Proletariat,” World Development 5, no. 5–7 (May 1977): 
559–571. 
5 Ibid., 561. 
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internal migration towards employment opportunities on these plantations. In the case of 
La Libertad, this has caused the unanticipated growth of a number of rapidly formed 
towns and communities to house migrant workers. As the State scrambles to provide 
migrants with basic services, the company has enjoyed access to an ever-evolving 
population of low-skilled workers looking for employment. 
One of the core objectives of recent neoliberal policies, as noted by Murray 
(2006), has been the exploitation of comparative advantage in the agro-food market by 
developing countries. Nontraditional export plantations have been a central means by 
which such an objective has been realized. The surplus of cheap and readily available 
labor paired with the increasing pressures put upon labor and the environment in a 
globalized market has had the effect of pitting capital against labor and small farmers and 
migrant workers against agribusiness.6 
The readings of Marx’s Capital (1990) are useful in discussions of capital and 
labor by way of product commodification. As is true with any other economic activity in 
a capitalist society, agribusiness is driven by the extraction of profit. The physical bodies 
of commodities –as is the case with nontraditional exports such as asparagus, avocadoes, 
and red peppers in La Libertad – are a combination of two elements, according to Marx: 
the material provided by nature and that which is provided by labor.7 The economic 
surplus afforded by capitalist production is dependent on both the productivity of the 
labor force and the exceptional characteristics unique to the land. 
As La Libertad region of Peru has growth further integrated with global markets 
by way of nontraditional exports, the relationship between local labor markets and 
international consumers has grown stronger. Furthermore, the relationship between the 
                                                 
6 Warwick E. Murray, “Neo-feudalism in Latin America? Globalisation, Agribusiness, and Land Re-concentration in Chile,” Journal 
of Peasant Studies 33, no. 4 (2006): 646–677. 
7 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, Reprint. (Penguin Classics, 1992). 
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State and private investors has driven decision-making processes and resource allocation. 
The influence of private capital and the effect on local labor is discussed by Bourgois 
(1989) in his research on the important role that private capital by way of the United Fruit 
Company came to play in local Costa Rican politics. “[Corporations] interact at the 
highest levels of government to ensure the protection of their interests,” he said, adding 
that the most common favors granted by local governments are lower taxation rates and 
generous land concessions. The third incentive meant to attract and maintain foreign 
investment is the lowering of labor costs, a strategy that has been employed in La 
Libertad with affects that will be discussed below. 
As globalization continues to increase direct competition between countries, the 
downward pressure placed upon the labor force continues to grow. The phenomenon 
known as “race to the bottom” predicts that those countries with the least restrictive labor 
(and environmental) standards will be the most attractive to foreign capital. As noted by 
Vandenburgh and Liu (2010), “Agricultural or raw materials markets, once they have 
been globalized, subject labor in the country to arguments that pay and benefits, if any, 
must be reduced if indigenous extraction industries are going to survive.”8 
While northern coastal Peru was identified by investors as having several 
advantageous geographic characteristics – fertile soil and nearness to ports among them – 
it was both the economic and labor incentives that made the region a destination for 
national and multinational corporations looking to enter the agribusiness. As a result, the 
growth of La Libertad nontraditional export industry has been largely led by agribusiness. 
While not all agribusiness operating in La Libertad is in the hands of multinational 
corporations, the research on MNCs has several applications to the development of 
                                                 
8 Henry Vandenburgh and Junqing Liu, “Campesino Communities in North Peru: Local Consequences of Globalization,” The Global 
South 4, no. 1 (2010): 122. 
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agribusiness in La Libertad. As Bury (2008) explains, transnational and multinational 
corporations transform the natural environment in a way that affects not only regional 
and global ecological processes, but also the “local populations that are dependent on 
them for survival.”9 
Furthermore, the rapid growth and expansion of agribusiness in La Libertad has 
been afforded by the liberalization of the labor market on behalf of the Peruvian 
government. The restructuring of the relationships between capital and labor is a classic 
and essential component of capitalist development. As is the case in Peru and throughout 
Latin America, the relationship between capital and labor in export-oriented capitalist 
markets has become increasingly flexible in recent years as part of a larger set of policies 
prescribed by neoliberal economic strategies for development. The diverse effects of the 
flexibilization of the labor market throughout the developing world have been the focus 
of much academic debate.  
According to Taylor (2002), what is at stake with labor flexibilization is the 
“flexibility of capital to absorb, utilize, and eject labour from the production process.”10 
Furthermore, labor flexibilization tends to remove the state institutions that once 
mediated the treatment of labor, putting such relationships instead in the hands of 
capitalist enterprises while making it easier for them to hire and fire laborers. Proponents 
of labor flexibilization hold it as a strategic route to job creation and economic growth, 
while its opponents lambast such tactics as a capitalist tool to heighten exploitation and 
abolish worker rights.11 As this study analyzes the ongoing challenges to the expression 
                                                 
9 Jeff Bury, “Transnational Corporations and Livelihood Transformations in the Peruvian Andes: An Actor-Oriented Political 
Ecology,” Human Organization 67, no. 3 (2008): 307. 
10 Marcus Taylor, “Interrogating the Paradigm of ‘Labour Flexibilization’: Neoclassical Prescriptions and the Chilean Experience,” 
Le Paradigme De La “Exibilisation Laborale” En Question: Les Prescriptions Néolibérales Et l  ’Expérience Chilienne. 35, no. 2 
(November 2002): 222–251. 
11 Ibid.  
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of labor rights in the northern Peruvian industry in the wake of labor flexibilization 
processes, it tends to agree with the conclusion of the latter, contradicting in part the 
conclusions of the former.  
The study that follows will consider how the rapid creation of thousands of jobs in 
a previously economically sluggish region has altered the physical and demographic 
composition of the region, established new divisions of labor, given rise to impassioned 
labor protests and seen, after much struggle, the first agribusiness union in northern Peru. 
It will then look at the ongoing challenges to labor organizing and the impasses to greater 
expression of basic labor rights ensured under several international agreements to which 
Peru is signatory. I will use the case of Camposol, the largest agribusiness in Peru and the 
largest exporter of asparagus in the world, to explore the opportunities and limitations 
associated with organizing within the industry. Furthermore, I will look SITECASA, the 
only independent union of Camposol, as an example of resistance to the distributive 
inequalities created by agribusiness in the region. The limits to organization in the case of 
SITECASA speak to wide-reaching challenges to workers throughout the northern 
Peruvian agroindustry.  
While a large body of research has focused on the economic viability of 
nontraditional exports as a development strategy, there has been less work done on the 
role of export-oriented agribusiness and the various ways that it has occupied and 
transformed local communities and geographies of production. As noted by Murray 
(2006) and Bury (2008), there have been few studies that seek to understand the 
grassroots impact, changes to the division of labor, and the process of class formation 
within nontraditional export markets. Aside from the geographical transformations 
undertaken in the region of La Libertad, the introduction of nontraditional export 
plantations has had the effect of rearranging local and migrant populations, altering the 
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social fabric of local communities and affecting the movement of labor on the regional 
level. 
Specifically, the employment opportunities created by agribusiness in La Libertad 
have drawn tens of thousands of internal migrants from neighboring provinces in the 
Amazon and Andes regions. Generally, these migrants come by way of two major 
mechanisms: social networks and recruiting practices. The composition of the migrants is 
reflective of the ethnic composition of neighboring regions, which tend to have much 
higher indigenous populations than the coastal region of La Libertad. Although migrants 
arriving to coastal Peru are by and large Peruvians, theories that follow the 
‘internationalization of the local economy” are pertinent to discussions of migration in La 
Libertad insofar as they speak to the ethnic diversification of the growing labor pool.12 
Soja (1989) describes a scenario in the Los Angeles manufacturing industry that 
has similar characteristics to the processes underway in La Libertad. In Los Angeles, an 
ethnically diverse migrant population – from Mexico, Central America, Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East – provides an overflowing pool of cheap labor.13 As a result, 
companies were able to exploit the differences between the different groups of labor with 
the effect of decimating organized labor. As we will see in discussion below, there are 
some similarities that can be drawn between this case and the case of migrating workers 
to the region of La Libertad. The origin and ethnicity of Peruvian migrants has come to 
play an important role in the evolving divisions of labor in agribusiness. Furthermore, the 
study how these divisions of labor may correlate to the permanence of workers in the 
industry and predict their involvement in labor activities.  
                                                 
12 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (Verso, 1989). 
13 Ibid. 
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The importance of gender in processes of economic globalization has been the 
subject of large bodies of research in recent years as women are entering the workplace in 
new occupational roles. Women have long played in important role in agricultural sectors 
of many developing countries, including Peru. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
regions that have shown strong shifts towards agribusiness in recent years, women have 
been increasingly entering the workforce en masse as income earners working alongside 
male counterparts. In Peru, an estimated 70 percent of workers laboring in asparagus 
plantations are women.14 Despite this fact, there are several institutional and historical 
challenges that continue to problematize the participation of women in the productive 
sector. The young age at which women enter agribusiness – generally 18 to 25 – as well 
as deep rooted gender discrimination tied to the female capacity for child bearing are two 
primary challenges that have systematically prevented women from being promoted to 
supervisory positions that would pay better wages and offer better job security.  
In the study that follows, I hope to shed light on the complex and interacting 
processes that have localized and contextualized the impact of nontraditional export 
market development on the workers and communities in the Chao and Virú valleys of La 
Libertad region.  
  
                                                 
14 Miguel Calisaya and Karim Flores, La Agroexportación No Tradicional En El País De Las Maravillas, 2006. 
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Chapter II: Methodology and Questions 
I will base this study on research conducted in Peru over the years of 2010 and 
2011. The section below will broadly outline the methodology that I employed in the 
field and while analyzing data at the University of Texas. It will further describe 
considerations of positionality and the questions that I sought to answer while working in 
the northern region of La Libertad.  
The members of the labor union SITECASA forced their way into the spotlight – 
and eventually into the heart of my research – with a series of impassioned chants and 
yells. I arrived to Chao in June of 2010 in the midst of particularly tense collective 
negotiations between SITECASA workers and their employer Camposol. A few weeks 
prior to my arrival in Chao, I had approached the Asociación Aurora Vivar, a Lima-based 
nonprofit that works to promote processes of collective action among workers throughout 
the Peruvian agroindustry. That I came to be in contact with Aurora Vivar was by way of 
suggestions made by researchers working at the Peruvian Center for Social Studies 
(CEPES), also in Lima. Their guidance was imperative in my beginning days and weeks 
on the project. 
I first visited Chao with Ana Montoya, a representative of Aurora Vivar who 
frequently travels from Lima to offer counseling to union members as they approached 
collective negotiations with their respective corporate counterpart. On this day in June, 
Montoya was travelling to support SITECASA members on the eve of a widely-
supported worker strike that was set to begin if collective negotiations – currently 
underway – didn’t adequately respond to worker demands. The Regional Ministry of 
Labor, the state entity that oversees all labor complaints, had deemed the impending 
strike to be legal, further bolstering the position of negotiating union leaders. Montoya, 
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who carefully maintained an air of pragmatism despite her clear commitment to radically 
improving labor relations between workers and corporations, was optimistic that the 
current negotiations might bear a particularly symbolic and elusive fruit: an increase to 
the workers’ minimum wage. In all her years working with unions, this would be the 
biggest stride for the workers’ movement should SITECASA achieve its goals. 
As a researcher, the appeal of the proposition was obvious. The low wages of 
agroindustry workers was a well-known topic of controversy dating to legislation passed 
during the reign of Alberto Fujimori. The laws had been challenged as unconstitutional 
and their undoing had long been the platform priority of agribusiness workers 
nationwide. I had been caught in the middle of a potentially landmark decision and was 
drawn, quite literally, through the open doors of the SITECASA locale in the middle of 
negotiations. Although SITECASA owned a small office in the nearby town of San José, 
on this night they had gathered behind a bus station on the Panamericana, the mega 
trans-continental highway that passes through the town of Chao. In the upcoming months 
and on several occasions in 2011, I would spend my time in Chao much in the way I did 
on this first night in June, observing SITECASA workers as they worked to identify 
problems and negotiate, in a manner that was equally inspired and chaotic, solutions to 
the challenges that most threatened them as workers, fathers, and mothers. 
In total, I spent more than four months in La Libertad. During this time, I did 
numerous interviews with union leaders and members, non-unionized workers, 
community members, representatives of Camposol, and government officials. When I 
wasn’t interviewing, I was jotting down observations and bits of loose conversation in my 
notebook or participating in a wide range of worker-related or community-based 
activities throughout the valleys of Chao and Virú. I spent most of my time in Chao, the 
town that also houses the headquarters of Camposol, but spent considerable time in the 
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community of Nuevo Chao – an extension community of Chao – and the nearby town of 
Virú that, along with Chao, is the other sizeable city in the heart of agribusiness 
production. These cities, which existed long before the introduction of agribusiness to the 
arid coast of La Libertad, have grown rapidly since the arrival of the nontraditional 
export plantations in the 1990s.  
Qualitative research methods, as opposed to quantitative methods, were far better 
suited for the kind of information I was looking to collect. Almost all of my analysis, 
with the exception of some economic and market context, will be based on interviews 
and observation collected while living and participating in the ongoing search for 
harmonization between union organizers, the State, and agribusiness interests. 
Ethnography is a method of observation commonly employed by anthropologists and 
other social scientists looking to discern meaning and formulate knowledge from an 
amorphous set of social patterns and complex interactions. The object of ethnography, 
according to Geertz (1990), is a “stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of 
which twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, 
perceived, and interpreted and without which they would not in fact exist, no matter what 
anyone did or didn’t do with his eyelids.” Ethnography makes use of what he and Gilbert 
Ryle have called “thick description,” a detailed drawing of a people, culture, or 
interactions that allow for an analysis of these structures of significance. 
In the study that follows, you will notice that my writing takes on three distinct 
tones: that of someone writing a personal narrative, that of a journalist telling the stories 
of workers and the experiences that they have lived, and that of an academic attempting 
to lay theory overtop the reality of observations and findings in the field. This 
meandering between tones is reflective of the disciplinary intersections between 
journalism and Latin American Studies that have resulted in what may, at best, approach 
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a style reminiscent of narrative journalism and, at worst, keep readers jumping between 
description and context while losing the overall impulse of the work. My hope it that the 
narrative breaks in the text will offer a window into the lives of the workers I spent so 
much time getting to know. Their words, the beds they slept in, and the decorations that 
hung on the walls they called home are details that help to make more personal a study 
that simultaneously attempts to drawn broad conclusions. 
As I documented the stories related to me by workers and community members, I 
began to weave a solidified if not highly heterogeneous notion of reality for an 
agribusiness worker in northern Peru. While my primary goal was to understand the 
limits to the expression of labor rights in agribusiness, this became secondary to 
understanding the particularities of each individual story. Without attention to personal 
detail, it would have been impossible for a larger story to emerge. Although many 
workers were native to the coast, a large portion had come from rural provinces, leaving 
behind family, homes, and belongings in the name of economic opportunity. Before 
understanding their conceptualization of labor rights, I first had to understand their 
reasons for migrating and their experiences as a worker away from home. 
Another important goal of my research was to understand what factors seemed to 
lead workers to join organized labor efforts, specifically those of SITECASA. In light of 
working conditions that were described as being almost unanimously difficult, 
demoralizing, and as the result of power relations that entangled questions of class, 
ethnicity, and gender, I wanted to know why some workers resisted such conditions and 
others chose not to. For those who had joined SITECASA, I wanted to understand what 
their experiences had been, what their perceived benefits of affiliation were, and what 
challenges seemed to impede tangible gains in collective negotiations.  
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The answer to this last question – or series of questions – was much more 
complicated than I had anticipated. Unionization rates, which were cited as one of the 
primary challenges to success by union members, appear to be impacted by a number of 
subtle factors that have interacted to discourage the affiliation of most workers to 
organized labor unions. The workplace – factory versus field – emerged as a predictor of 
union activity, as did place of origin and ethnicity, to some extent. Furthermore, the 
migration mechanism used by workers arriving to the plant held some bearing on the 
amount of time those workers were likely to spend in agribusiness, a factor which further 
influenced their decision to join a labor union. These considerations will be explored in 
more depth in the sections that follow. 
On a larger scale, whether or not a worker chose to affiliate with a labor union 
was inevitably influenced by the historic oppression of labor movements in Peru as well 
as the dominating economic and legal framework that has discouraged union legitimacy 
in ways that will be discussed below. As is true throughout much of Latin America, 
Peruvian workers have suffered from systematic oppression by government forces 
throughout their history. As the State cedes more power to the invisible hand of the free 
market, union forces have largely been left to the mercy of private actors. The laws and 
economies that govern agribusiness have continued to play a role in the agency that 
unionized workers are able to express as individuals and in collective groups. It is also 
true that the corporate cultures and policies of MNCs and domestic agribusiness – 
Camposol in this case – play a large role, both subtle and overt, in determining the 
perceived freedom of workers looking to organize to improve working conditions. 
It was due to these difficult to describe and complex set of processes guiding 
union organizing efforts and the decisions made by individual workers that I chose 
qualitative methods of evaluation. It was in the long hours that I spent in the union locale, 
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riding buses with workers to and from the fields, and meeting them in their homes at the 
end of a long workday that I began to grasp the complex relationships of power in the 
workplace that intersected with their own understanding of ethnicity and how the 
stratospheric framework of the free market spoke to the malnutrition of children in local 
schools. Everything was connected and nothing was insignificant. 
My ability to successfully approach workers, both unionized and not, grew in 
direct proportion to the amount of time I invested in the community. The more familiar I 
became with all of the people that formed part of the city of Chao – the street vendors, 
the police officers, and the boys that manned the counters at the numerous Internet cafés 
– the smaller the perceived barriers between me as researcher and them as resident 
became. I spent many hours talking about the delicacies of the Peruvian cuisine, the 
failings of the blanquirroja, and the promises of the newly elected Ollanta Humala before 
I earned my way to questions about their families, their stories of migration, and their 
relation to agribusiness.  
As anthropologist Philippe Bourgois describes in her book In Search of Respect, 
“only by establishing long-term relationships based on trust can one begin to ask 
provocative personal question and expect thoughtful, serious answers”15 
There were abundant reasons as to why this trust – or any such trust earned by a 
researcher – would be (and should be) difficult to earn. The first reason, and arguably the 
most serious in the agroindustry of La Libertad, was the precarious nature of the jobs held 
by all workers in the valleys of Chao and Virú. None of the workers, unionized or not, 
had many illusions about job security nor the uniqueness of the skills that they brought to 
the position. They were highly aware that companies were doing well at least in part 
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because of an abundant, cheap, and replaceable workforce. Asking for trust from workers 
was dependent upon first asking them to spend time with me, both of us well knowing 
that being seen together could put their job at risk and, moreover, that I was likely to ask 
them questions that could put their employers in a compromising light. This remained a 
delicate issue throughout my research. 
The second hurdle, arguably easier to overcome, was a prevailing suspicion 
among workers that I was affiliated with the company, spending long hours with the 
union and asking for interviews only to undermine organizing efforts. This assumption, 
as it was explained to me by a number of workers, was largely due to my skin color and 
presumed class background. Whiteness, they explained, was a characteristic that most 
workers – not white themselves – associated with upper management in the various 
agribusinesses that employed them. “You are the same color as management,” Jorge, a 
field worker at Camposol, said to me before a large union meeting. “They’ll understand 
you, but you have to understand them, too.”  This concern eased with time; as I grew 
closer to group leaders and workers, their ease with my presence grew stronger.  
My primary methodological challenge, then, was a combination of overcoming – 
and avoiding – the fear among workers that my research could put their jobs and their 
families at risk. For those associated with SITECASA, being an openly identified 
member of the union was enough to generate company suspicion. The days of 
blacklisting union members and systematically applying layoffs to those who were seen 
to cause trouble weren’t yet in the distant past and, as many would argue, hadn’t yet 
ended entirely. Talking to a foreigner who had been alternately described to them as a 
journalist, an activist, and a researcher could potentially be another mark against their 
name. For many, it was a mark they didn’t want to risk. As I understood these concerns, I 
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didn’t push interviews with anyone who wasn’t interested and did my best to meet union 
members at night in their homes. 
While the workers, company representatives, and government officials that I 
interviewed projected their experiences, realities and fears onto me, neither could I 
separate my experiences and unique positionality from my perceptions of them. As has 
been noted by other acclaimed ethnographers, Javier Auyero and Nancy Scheper Hughes 
among them, the perspective and judgments that we carry with us into the field are often 
the result of our own politics and experience.  
Questions of positionality were central throughout the research process, not only 
during interviews. In a participation-based study that engages questions of privilege, 
access to resources, and the legacy of domination and dependency imposed by policies 
pushed by the United States, it was impossible – and would have been arguably 
irresponsible – to have separated my own background from my work. The process of 
conducting research, collecting data, and performing interviews was an extension and 
alteration of internal processes that had been set into motion nearly three decades earlier. 
Gender – both mine and that of the workers and other interviewees – was a solid 
undercurrent to many of my experiences in the field. As a woman working among 
plantation workers in an industrial and agricultural settling, most of the unionized 
workers, ranking officials, company representatives, and other industry players that I 
interviewed were male. The different roles that men and women held in Peruvian society 
were reflected in my interviews and projected onto me as a visitor in their land. The 
information collected in interviews with women and men similarly reflected how society 
had historically defined the roles of men and women in decision-making processes and 
the specific challenges that corresponded to female workers both in the home and in the 
plantation. 
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Those who work in the coastal agribusiness are arguably some of the most 
vulnerable members of the sociedad Liberteña, women holding a particularly precarious 
position due to the seeming incompatibility of plantation employment with the demands 
child bearing and rearing. Discussions of poverty, which often center on ethnicity and 
power dynamics, can lend themselves to further promoting negative stereotypes and “the 
other”-izing of, in this case, the working poor as a kind of agribusiness proletariat. 
Without drawing universally broad conclusions, this study looks to highlight some 
general tendencies embodied by a concrete and specific context as observed in the coastal 
agribusiness of La Libertad. In doing so, it will attempt to shed light on how the 
particularities of such research could lend themselves to broader patterns telling of the 
challenges to organizing among workers in similar agribusiness contexts.  
Over the course of the total three and a half months I spent in La Libertad, I 
collected a total of 49 interviews – 17 of these were audio recordings and the other 32 
were noted in my journals; all of them were later transcribed for use in this study. Most 
interviews took place in the communities of Chao, Nuevo Chao, and Virú. Interviews 
were done, as I mentioned, in the privacy and quiet of workers’ homes when possible and 
in public places (parks, plazas) or restaurants when no other such option was available. 
Although the workers lived in a number of small settlements or formal towns that have 
grown along the edges of the expansive export plantations, most of the workers were 
collected at the beginning and end of each day at bus stops in Chao. This, in additional to 
the fact that I was living in Chao while undertaking this research, made it an obvious and 
convenient location to approach workers to interview. I relied on outgoing union 
members and the trusted contacts of Aurora Vivar to carry out preliminary interviews. 
From there, I was carried by the good will of workers, whose casual introductions and 
contact suggestions allowed me to organically grow my list of participants. 
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Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two hours in length and were loosely based 
around a series of five to ten questions relating to place of origin, mode of migration, 
working conditions on the plantation, their experiences at work, and their reasons for 
affiliating (or not) with SITECASA. As one would imagine, such questions often led to 
lengthy personal narrative and background descriptions that endured numerous refills to 
my glass of Inca or Coca-Cola. But while the importance of lengthy discussions were not 
always apparent to me at the time of the interview, as the weeks went on these 
conversations became basis by which I began to understand how decision-making 
processes and the creation of meaning different among workers. The informal nature of 
the interviews also allowed space for workers to raise questions or voice concerns about 
things that didn’t appear on my list of questions. In this way, I gained a sense of what 
issues were most important to specific workers.  
In 2010, I interviewed a total of 13 workers. Of these, 10 belonged to SITECASA 
and three did not. In 2011, I interviewed an additional 19 workers, with some repeat 
interviews with workers from the previous year not reflected in that total. Of the 19 new 
workers that I interviewed in 2011, 11 were unionized, eight were not. In total, I did 31 
formal interviews with workers, 21 unionized and 10 that were not. As I will discuss in 
following sections, almost all workers were divided into two categories that became an 
important distinguishing factor as discussions of union affiliation came to the forefront: 
those who worked in the factory and those who worked in the field.  
In the next section, I will establish a historical link between trade and labor in 
Peru and elsewhere in Latin American before entering into a more specific discussion as 




Chapter III: Trade and Labor in the Peruvian Context 
Trade and labor have historically been pitted against one another in questions of 
modernization and policies of economic liberalization. As globalization continues to 
increase direct competition between countries, the downward pressure placed upon the 
labor force continues to grow. The phenomenon, known as the “race to the bottom,” 
predicts that those countries with the least restrictive environmental and labor standards 
will attract the most investment. Liberalizing tools, such as free trade agreements, have 
further opened the markets of several Latin American countries to multinational 
companies from the United States and Europe who are looking to capitalize on low labor 
costs and non-existent or weakly enforced environmental and labor regulations.  
The research outlined in this chapter intends to shed light on how this general 
conflict has played out in the country of Peru and specifically in the context of the 
recently signed U.S. – Peru Free Trade Agreement, also known as the Peruvian Trade 
Promotion Act (PTPA). The PTPA, which was signed in 2006 and went into effect in 
early 2009, contains an updated labor chapter which sought to address some of the 
concerns associated with the “race to the bottom.”  
This chapter will trace major political periods in Peruvian history, exploring the 
trade frameworks dominant in each as well as the result for the collective labor 
movement where applicable. There has been much written about the way that trade and 
collective political activity have influenced one another as separate actors in Latin 
America, particularly in light of neoliberal policies that swept over the region as a result 
of economic crisis through the 1980s. Generally, Peru followed the regional trend of 
import-substitution policies in the 1960s and 70s, followed by the accumulation of 
foreign debt and economic decline that was countered by the opening of domestic 
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markets to international competition throughout the 1990s. The results of a collective 
Latin American turn towards the international market have been mixed, and while there is 
much to be said in evaluating the impacts of such policies beyond their effects on labor, 
such conclusions fall beyond the scope of this study.  
The origins of the Peruvian labor movement, similar to those in Ecuador, lay in 
the mutual-benefit societies of the late 19th century. Such societies had all but 
disappeared by mid-20th century, replaced by the sindicatos that we see in present-day 
Peru. It was primarily in the post-World War II era that plantation workers, 
sharecroppers, tenants, and other peasant groups took part in the labor movement en 
masse.16 
The coastal province of La Libertad, which is the geographical focus of this study, 
has rich and long-reaching ties to the labor movement. Early on, labor unions were used 
as a tool for political power by the American Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a party 
founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, himself a native to Trujillo, the capital of La 
Libertad. The labor movement was closely tied to APRA until the 1980s, when a deep-
reaching economic crisis caused union activity in the face of job insecurity to steeply 
decrease. Union activity, which remained stifled by slowly recovering economic 
conditions and new anti-labor laws enacted throughout the 1990s, reappeared in a 
meaningful way only after the fall of the Fujimori regime. Although union activity has 
increased under both Toledo and Garcia, a number of anti-labor measures from the 
Fujimori regime remain a challenge for labor organizers.  
In a country where the State has come to be known to many as “lejano y ajeno,” – 
both remote and foreign – and neoliberal policies have ceded responsibility to private 
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entities and the free market, the role of the union as mediator between the concerns of 
workers and the companies that employ them has become more important in recent 
decades.17  
As Rosa Arciniega (1995) describes, one cannot talk about the capacity for union 
strength without talking about industrial relations. And when we talk about industrial 
relationships, we are necessarily talking about a complicated confluence of industrial-
legal frameworks, power structures, as well as norms and practices that regulate work 
relations and conditions in a triangle between the State, capital, and labor.18 
As Moisés Arce (2008) notes, the dominant perspective on neoliberalism and 
political (and labor) organizing paints “economic liberalization as the cause and 
consequence of widespread social depoliticization and demobilization.”19 This theory 
suggests that the economic crisis and consequent neoliberal resolutions, as seen in Peru 
through the 1980s and 1990s, collectively hurt the capacity of society to organize and 
mobilize around their concerns. Arciniega (1996) similarly posits that the weakening of 
unions over the years has been tied to changes in the international division of labor, 
which has led to abnormal (temporary) contracts, a larger group of workers in the 
informal labor market, and other destabilizing factors.  
Yet, as Arce points out, this prevailing school of thought doesn’t adequately 
explain the recent resurgence in protest and organizing in a country or region that in large 
part continues to embrace a neoliberal market as a guiding force. The market may, he 
argues, actually act as a stimulating force for labor organizers and political involvement. 
A second school of thought has emerged as a result, emphasizing the repolitizication of 
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18 Rosa Arciniega, “Relaciones Industriales y sindicalismo en Perú,” Estudios Sociológicos 14, no. 41 (August 1996): p331–352. 
19 Moisés Arce, “The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in Peru,” Latin American Politics and Society 50, no. 
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actors in the wake of efforts to liberalize the economic framework. This is especially true, 
he argues, if political liberalization efforts have taken place concurrently.20 
What Polyani (1957) described as the “double movement” is relevant when 
discussing the recent resurgence of collective action, protests, and labor activity in Peru 
in recent years. In his theory, the market and “huge fictitious bodies called corporations” 
which exact a high social cost and alter the “fabric of society,” would be met with 
resistance by a countermovement aimed at protecting society’s most vulnerable members 
from the “effects of an untamed market.”21  Thus, instead of demobilizing a population of 
affected workers, the market may have created the conditions and the space for workers 
to mobilize against the social costs of liberalization.  
Still there are likely a number of factors that explain the resurgence of union 
activity in Peru in recent years, among them labor laws that have given more space for 
unions to form and participate in negotiations. The next sections will look at how the 
historical evolution of trade and labor through the years as a background that will frame 
the emergence of SITECASA and contextualize some of the broadest challenges faced by 
the union.  
1930 – 1968: 
Throughout the 1950s, Peru diverged from the nationalist trends that prevailed 
throughout Latin America, inviting foreign direct investment into the country in such a 
way that by 1960 the State’s share of national investment was much lower than in other 
South American nations.  Although this tendency towards foreign investment has been 
touted as “symbiotic” by Thorp (1983), who claims that international investors worked 
                                                 
20 Arce, “The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in Peru.” 
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alongside Peruvian companies, the ultimate effect was a weakening of forces that in other 
countries led to the strengthening of nationalist groups and administrative capabilities and 
structures.22 
By 1960, the export-led growth model had rendered the State weak and a crisis 
that grew out of the inconsistencies between the changing socio-political context of the 
country and a resource-based, extractive development model began to unfold. Exports 
slowed and investment nearly came to a halt. The business-friendly conditions that 
multinationals (MNCs) had come to enjoy in Peru were appearing increasingly 
incompatible with social and political sentiments.  
The shift towards import substitution began shortly thereafter. The investment 
coefficient in the period between 1955 and 1958 was 17.5 percent in the private sphere, 
compared to 10.8 percent between 1964 and 1968 and a near thirding of private 
investment between 1974 and 1976, when the rate teetered at a meager 6.5 percent. 23  
While the steady decline of investment through the 1960s was not the only indicator of an 
economy and society in distress, it was a primary factor that, according to several 
scholars, in part predicted the military coup that would ensure in 1968.  
The leverage of the labor movement in Peru mirrored changes in the economic 
and political landscape throughout these years. The institutionalization of labor relations 
in Peru began at the turn of the century, when the country began to look to foreign 
markets and export-dominated growth as a strategy for economic development. In these 
early years, the State recognized labor rights while establishing regulations that strictly 
limited workers’ ability to exercise them. From 1930 to 1968, industrial relations were 
described as a hybrid with high levels of rigidity in the area of collective worker rights – 
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organization and collective bargaining – and high levels of flexibility in individual 
relations – workday hours, wages, etc.24  Prior to 1968, benefits to workers largely came 
in an authoritarian manner, from the top down, and only during the military government 
(1968 – 1980) would workers begin to make real gains in collective labor rights. 
Political leaders of the APRA worked closely with union leaders in the 1940s, 
50s, and 60s, in a partnership that was, in some ways, mutually beneficial to candidates 
seeking to grow their support among the working class and to unions who needed 
political figures to champion their causes on a national stage. The APRA coordinated 
strikes with union leaders to be used as “political coercion,” a way to more directly target 
the government’s executive branch in these years.25  
In 1960, Peru became a signatory member to four of the eight International 
Labour Organization (ILO) fundamental Conventions (CO87, CO29, CO105, CO100) – 
one regarding the freedom of association, two regarding forced labor, and one dealing 
with remuneration and discrimination in the workplace. Later, in 1964, it signed on to an 
additional Convention (CO161), which granted the right to organize and collectively 
bargain. APRA has been, in large part, credited with these advancements. Within 
companies, however, the APRA encouraged what has been described as a “clientelism” 
that instilled a company-brand unionization whose goal was to avoid conflict in the 
political sphere. All gains made by labor unions at this time were described as being the 
results of company will more than reflective of successful organizing or respect for 
workers’ demands.26 
                                                 




THE MILITARY JUNTA FROM 1968 – 1975: 
In October of 1968, military forces pushed Fernando Belaúnde Terry into exile 
and, headed by Juan Velasco Alvarado, seated the “Revolutionary Government of the 
Armed Forces” – the Military Junta – at the helm of what was seen to be sinking 
economic ship. The new government’s goals, ambitious and broad, were to end external 
dependence, accelerate economic growth, radically improve the distribution of wealth, 
carry out a number of reforms (agrarian, education, etc.), make Peru a leader of the Third 
World, and to create a “new Peruvian man.” Regarding the goals of the Military Junta, 
Velasco gave a speech in July 1968 stating that “the investment of foreign capital in our 
countries must be rationalized. Even though private foreign investment creates focal 
points of economic modernization in the conditions at present, it also serves as a means 
of sucking up the wealth of Latin American countries (…) The development of other 
areas of the world that operate as zones of expansion of modern industrialism becomes 
more dynamic because of the wealth extracted from Latin America.”27  
In total, roughly 4,000 laws were enacted during this time. Within a week of the 
takeover, Peru expropriated the International Petroleum Company, an Exxon subsidiary, 
and within the year enacted an agrarian reform that seized and divided the vast, wealthy 
sugar estates of the coast. It was announced that a new “special property” sector of 
worker-managed firms would dominate the new model of economic organization.28 
In 1971, Aníbal Quijano, a prominent Peruvian sociologist, dismissed the idea 
that the military government was acting in ways that countered imperialist interests. 
Instead, he declared the reformation of government as a new form of imperialist 
domination in Latin America.   Others, including Laura Guasti (1983), contend that the 
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military regime was, on the whole, a deterrent for investors looking to locate to Peru and 
had the effect, specifically in mining, of forcing corporations out of the country. This 
investment boycott, she maintains, led to an increase in foreign debt that put the country 
at the mercy of the banks. This further complicated one of the main goals of the military 
regime: economic autonomy.29 
  Yet most scholars agree that the Military Junta undertook a project that, to some 
degree, fit under the broad definition of “nationalization” and that it had the slight to 
moderate effect of deterring foreign investment. The State expanded during this period 
and relationships with the foreign investors that stayed in Peru became much more 
symmetrical. 
The Velasco years are market by a transition to a rigid labor framework 
characterized by increased state intervention and a new body of legislation that is much 
more favorable to laborers than the flexible labor regime that prevailed during the 
Belaúnde administration. Reforms enacted during the first Velasco years pitted 
companies against the government, as it attempted to create better conditions and greater 
negotiating power for workers. According to Arciniega (1996), it was during these years 
that the Peruvian labor movement made its principal gains in wages and benefits.30 
It was also during this period that labor unions began to distance themselves from 
the APRA. The rate of unionized Peruvian workers continued to grow and in 1971 the 
Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (the CGTP), a centralized class-based 
union, was first recognized by the government. A year prior, in 1970, Peru signed yet 
another ILO Convention (CO111), this one dealing more specifically with discrimination 
in terms of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin. 
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The Velasco administration also introduced severance payments for laborers at this time. 
As a solidifying force among Peruvian unions, the CGTP was able to consolidate union 
goals and, in years to come, enter directly into negotiations with the national government 
without a party affiliation. 
As unions broke away from APRA-based support, the CGTP and base-level 
unions grew increasingly close to left-wing political organizations and the Communist 
Party at a time that some researchers have noted as the beginning of the conflictive 
imagine that unions would acquire in the years and decades to come. Companies, which 
up until this point had enjoyed great flexibility in labor relations, fought the increase in 
union demands, resulting in a marked increase in strike activity.31 Overall, the military 
government oversaw a substantial increase in union affiliation and activity. 
THE 1980S AND ECONOMIC CRISIS:    
In 1980, with the Peruvian economy sinking deep into depression, the military 
allowed an election that would bring Belaúnde out of exile and back into Peru as 
president for the next five years. Despite having achieved 45 percent of the vote, an 
impressive margin in elections with 15 candidates, his support quickly faded as the 
Shining Path and other insurgent groups gained power. 
The economic crisis was not specific to Peru, however. Throughout Latin 
America, the 1980s were characterized by a failure of nationalist-leaning policies to 
attract foreign investment and thus cover fiscal deficits. The regional response, with some 
exceptions, was the adoption of liberalization strategies and a withdrawal of the State 
from the economic sphere. International financing institutions offered conditional debt 
payment programs and structural adjustment. Most notably, the International Monetary 
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Fund offered substantial conditional loans to several Latin American countries during this 
period.  
Through the 1980s, Peru saw an economic decline that was unparalleled 
anywhere in South America. In 1989, the real minimum wage had plunged to 23 percent 
of what it had been in 1980, while the region as a whole was holding at 75 percent.32 
In 1983, Lowenthal wrote that “trade unions, still heavily influenced by political 
parties, are far stronger than they were in the 1960s, despite recent efforts to weaken 
them.” Unions were also reported as increasingly militant at this time, demonstrating 
their power and demands in the streets more freely than before.33 
In 1985, when Alan Garcia was elected president, he reversed the country’s 
cooperation with the IMF in favor of what he called a new movement towards Peruvian 
sovereignty. He pursued what would later be known as the “heterodox stabilization 
program,” refusing to pursue any privatizations and limiting debt payments until after 
domestic growth targets were met. In 1987, Garcia announced his intention to nationalize 
all banks and insurance companies. As the years passed, it was clear that the country was 
unable to support the cost of nationalizing financial institutions. His attempts at economic 
restructuring, ultimately flawed, have been compared to those attempted by Velasco 
years before.34  
FUJIMORI AND THE FALL OF A CAUDILLO: 
In 1990, when Alberto Fujimori became the president of Peru, he took power 
amidst a groundswell of violence being committed by insurgent groups against the 
civilian population. Promising to act with a firm hand against the Sendero Luminoso 
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(Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), Fujimori 
enjoyed broad support from a population shaken by recent violence and weakened by the 
economic crisis of the 1980s. 
Once elected, Fujimori enacted a series of neoliberal and free-trade oriented 
economic reforms, later known as “Fujishock,” that were brought immediately into 
effect. By 1991, the real minimum was had fallen to nearly half of what it had been in 
1989, which was already severely low. By mid-1991, “critical poverty” had come to 
affect roughly half of the population.35  
Peru had grown to be severely indebted and again turned to international 
financing institutions, primarily the IMF and the World Bank, to facilitate a recovery. 
While structural adjustment programs sponsored by the IMF and World Bank were 
implemented throughout Latin America during this period, the economic shock therapy 
that Peru was dealt upon electing Fujimori was termed the “most severe form of 
economic engineering ever applied in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa or Eastern 
Europe since the 1981-1982 world economic recession.”36 
In broad terms, Fujimori followed the Washington Consensus recipe for economic 
recovery. He liberalized trade, privatized agricultural land, opened the banking system to 
private companies, and limited the role of the State across all sectors. Public employees 
were laid off and government expenditure was cut, particularly spending in education and 
health. The immediate social impacts were wide reaching. Research on these policies as a 
bundle emphasize the importance of a) the autonomy of state actors and exclusionary 
decision-making rights and b) the marginalization or defeat of those who opposed market 
liberalization, namely organized labor and labor-oriented parties. 
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On a plane to Washington to meet with a representative of the IMF, Fujimori is 
reported as saying to his advisor: “if the economic shock were to work, the Peruvian 
people would no doubt forgive me.”37  
On April 5, 1992, Fujimori suspended the 1979 constitution, sent several 
opposition leaders to prison, and disassembled the State’s Congress and judiciary branch. 
With support of the Peruvian military, he carried out an autogolpe (self-coup) that 
deliberately undermined Peruvian institutions and allowed him to build an executive 
branch that suited his economic and political agenda.  
In 1993, the signing of the Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA) lowered a number of tariffs on Peruvian exports to the United States and 
encouraged the production of nontraditional exports – such as asparagus, artichoke, and 
avocado – in an attempt to thwart production of drugs in Andean countries. Years, later, 
the ATPDEA became the foundation upon which the U.S. – Peru Trade Promotion Act 
would be built. 
As McClintock (1993) notes, Fujimori enjoyed a 60 percent approval rating at the 
time of the autogolpe and most Peruvians believed that democracy as it was currently 
operating had failed. The “Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction,” a 
name of Fujimori’s post-autogolpe government, promised to build a better democracy.38 
While impoverished conditions throughout the country were maintained and in 
some cases made to be worse, workers grew more fearful of losing their jobs and labor 
activity decreased in a corresponding fashion. Many Peruvians also took on a second or 
third job to maintain their families, which made for less expendable time that could have 
otherwise been dedicated to a union. The APRA, which had historically led the labor 
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unions and had politically directed the country for the previous 15 years, was held in-part 
accountable for the crisis at hand and lost both respect and influence throughout the 
country.39   
The market restructuring effectively limited the capacity of social actors to 
modify, in any way, the policy reforms that had been enacted; it had also limited the 
extent to which the State was able to incorporate societal demands. Along with the deep 
social consequences of Fujishock was the de facto elimination of all channels through 
which societal actors would have voiced their concerns.40  
In addition to economic vulnerability and social insecurity, which acted to limit 
union activity during this period, Fujimori enacted a number of labor reforms that further 
limited the ability of workers to organize and make demands. In 1992, Fujimori imposed 
restrictions on strike activity and decreased funding for the Ministry of Labor’s 
enforcement activity. At the time, the vice minister of labor referred to the Ministry of 
Labor as the “James Bond Ministry,” as it only accounted for 00.7 percent of the national 
budget. Anner estimates that the rate of unionization in Peru decreased by 66.67 percent 
from 1991 to 1998, from 30 to 10 percent of the overall population.41 Firing costs 
diminished sharply in these years through the elimination of job security regulations 
enacted by the military government. Reductions in firing costs and lower severance pay 
generally had the effect of reducing the duration of employment and increasing turnover. 
Moreover, several union activists were threatened, jailed, and killed by the 
administration and their agents during these years in human rights violations that have led 
to the present incarceration of Fujimori and an ongoing investigation by the Peruvian 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In December of 1992, at the beginning of the 
labor overhaul, the outspoken leader of the CGTP, Pedro Huilca Tecse, was killed at the 
hand of Grupo Colina, a para-military group mandated by Fujimori. 
The Law 27360: 
At the heels of the Fujimori dictatorship, in the year 2000, Law 27360 was passed 
as a temporary measure to stimulate investment in the agroindustry such as that currently 
flourishing in the region of La Libertad. The law effectively reduced the amount of 
vacation that agroindustry workers would receive from 30 – the amount enjoyed by non-
agroindustry workers – to 15. Article 7 of the Law 27360 creates a separate labor regime 
for agroindustry workers, allowing more flexible contracts, a higher hourly wage, but an 
exemption from a yearly payment known as the Compensación por Trabajo de Servicio 
(CTS) and gratificaciones, a semi-annual paid by private employers to workers, as well 
as half the vacation time and flexible definitions of a standards work day, over time, and 
the corresponding pay to each. 
The College of Lawyers of Ica (Colegio de Abogados de Ica), a group of lawyers 
that takes on legal projects of public interests, brought the case to the Constitutional 
Tribunal of Peru in 2006, claiming that the law was unconstitutional and discriminatory. 
In 2007, a year before the Constitutional Tribunal delivered its ruling on Law 27360 Dr. 
Enrique Fernández-Maldonado Mujica, Peruvian sociologist and director of Prevention 
and Solution of Labor Conflicts and Social Responsibility within the Peruvian Ministry 
of Labor, published Los Derechos Laborales en los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio: 
Análisis del TLC Perú – EE.UU. y perspectivas para el Acuerdo de Asociación CAN – 
UE. 
 33 
His findings suggested that Law 27360 was inconsistent with the labor standards 
agreed upon in the Peruvian Trade Promotion Act, which will be discussed in the 
following section. There is a contradiction, he claimed, in the discriminatory treatment 
legalized in Law 27360, a promotional law in nature, and the principals of ILO 
Conventions 110 and 111 that prohibit discrimination in the workplace.  The Law affects 
the workers in the agribusiness only, legalizing the payment of fewer social benefits than 
those workers in the standard labor regimen, a difference that is discriminatory in 
nature.42 
In the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision, however, delivered in 2008, the 
Tribunal rejected the charge that Law 27360 was discriminatory. Below is an excerpt 
from their decision: 
 
“The regulation established by the Common Labor Regime, on one hand, and for 
the Agricultural Labor Regime on the other, are not comparable stricto sensu, but 
they rather … present substantial differences that allow for different legislative 
treatment due to objective and justified reasons, not having produced a violation 
of the principal right to Equality; therefore, the Law that regulates the labor 
regime, specialize for agriculture, is not discriminatory.”43 
Also: 
 
“… It is article 103 of the Constitution, which authorizes legislation of a special 
and exceptional manner when, given the nature of the subject, it is merited for 
reasons that are not arbitrary or unfounded. … The reason that occasions the 
intervention of differentiated legislation is precisely the nature of the subject, the 
uniqueness of the labor context in the agricultural sector, which is characterized 
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by its temporality, random nature, mobility, seasonality, informality, and difficult 
access to employment.”44 
 
In the report Labor Market Politics and Rural Poverty in Latin America, published 
under the supervision of the ILO with the FAO in 2012, Fernando Eguren, sociologist at 
the Center for Peruvian Social Studies (CEPES), explicitly references the harm done by 
Law 27360. “This law has been a reason for concern among organizations that defend 
labor rights, as it marks a break with those rights that workers have gained and had 
recognized.”  In this sense, it would appear that the ILO at very least recognizes that 
some concerns with Law 27360 exist, choosing to expound upon its effects in an their 
annual publication on rural poverty.45 
The current implications of this law, which continue to affect collective 
bargaining in the agroindustry, will reappear in our discussions of SITECASA in Chapter 
VI. 
POST-FUJIMORI: 
After a controversial attempt to by Fujimori to remain in power at the end of his 
two terms in the year 2000, Alejandro Toledo was elected to office in 2001 with the 
promise of increasing social spending and working with those most severely affected by 
Fujimori’s policies. After the first year of his presidency, social budgetary issues had 
increased 7.5 percent as compared with Fujimori’s last.46 In contrast to the tight-lipped 
effect that Fujimori had had on the labor movement, the transition to the democratic 
government of Toledo in 2001 produced an environment that was more tolerant of 
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mobilization. In 2002, the magazine Caretas reported that at least 800 different protests 
took place in the city of Lima.47  
That same year, Peru enacted the Law on Days of Work, Hours and Overtime, 
which sets the maximum days and hours of work, night work, and regulates overtime 
hours. These are collectively known as individual labor rights, as opposed to collective 
labor rights which affect a population’s ability to organize and collectively bargain. It 
was also in 2002 that Peru adopted its final two of the eight fundamental ILO 
Conventions (CO138 and CO182) on the minimum age for laborers and the worst forms 
of child labor.   
Peru’s Law on Collective Labor Relations, enacted in 2003, regulated freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike – so-called collective rights. In 
2005, the government established Regulations on Safety and Health in the Workplace, 
which laid down minimum safety and health standards, enforcement responsibilities, as 
well as the rights and responsibilities of employees and employers. While we see that a 
number of positive individual and collective labor reforms took place after the fall of 
Fujimori, the on-the-ground experience of many unions during these years did not reflect 
the advancements made on paper. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, 
using specific examples from the case of SITECASA in La Libertad. 
THE NEW TRADE POLICY WITH AMERICA: 
In 2006, Peru and the United States signed the Peruvian Trade Promotion Act 
(PTPA), which further consolidated an already strong trading relationship. While the 
PTPA promises to have a number of positive impacts on the Peruvian economy, it 
contains an updated chapter on labor standards that is of relevance to this study. As part 
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of the so-called “New Trade Policy with America,” Chapter 17 of the PTPA is intended 
to reconcile some of those problems in labor that have been linked to increased trading 
pressure.  
After the original signing of the PTPA in 2006, a number of labor groups – 
primarily based in the U.S. – argued that the labor language was still not strong enough to 
protect workers in the U.S. from being outcompeted for their jobs overseas – the 
recurring theme of the “race to the bottom.” Especially outspoken was the AFL-CIO, 
which as an organization has categorically opposed free trade agreements for this reason, 
arguing that workers in the U.S. cannot compete with countries that don’t respect basic 
labor standards. 
Historically, labor provisions have not been included in bilateral trade agreements 
or free trade agreements, as labor issues were considered to be of domestic concern, not 
related to trade. The earliest international organization responsible for monitoring trade, 
whose conventions we’ve already discussed, was the ILO, founded in 1919 and now 
forming part of the United Nations.  
The ILO has currently adopted 183 Conventions, eight of which fall into four key 
areas that are considered their “core labor standards.” These include 1) the freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, 2) the elimination of forced labor, 3) the 
elimination of child labor, and 4) the elimination of discrimination in respect to 
employment and occupation. While the ILO has no enforcement mechanisms, it 
promoted compliance with labor standards through what Bolle (2008) identified as 
“consensus, moral suasion, and technical assistance.”48 
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On May 10 2007, the labor language was updated to include four additional 
principles: 1) that each party to an agreement should “adopt and maintain in its statutes, 
regulations, and practices, the rights as stated in the ILO Declaration and its Follow-Up”; 
2) that no party can lower its labor standards; 3) that no party can use discretion regarding 
resources and policy priorities as justification for patterns of action or inaction; and 4) the 
dispute settlement processes for commercial disputes should be the same as for labor 
disputes. 
The PTPA was the first FTA to be renegotiated with this new and stricter 
language in 2007. As opposed to the labor provisions of NAFTA or CAFTA-DR, all of 
the labor provisions of the PTPA are fully enforceable through the same dispute 
mechanisms used by commercial disputes. This is true for State-State disputes and 
investor-State disputes and, for the first time in any trade agreement, the mechanisms 
refer to the obligations outlined in the labor chapter rather than referring to each party’s 
obligation under domestic law.49 
In general, any individual or group wishing to file a complaint under the 
guidelines established by the PTPA would have a formal complaint prepared by a non-
State party – most commonly a labor union, and submitted to the Office of Trade and 
Labor Affairs (OTLA) in the Department of Labor. Only one such complaint has been 
filed to the OTLA under the PTPA and, to date, not a single labor dispute in a free trade 
agreement has reached the United States Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) for 
arbitration. The possible role that Chapter 17 of the PTPA could play in future union 
negotiations will be discussed in the study’s conclusions. 
                                                 
49 Jeanne J. Grimmett, Dispute Settlement Under the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: An Overview (Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress, August 12, 2011). 
 38 
This chapter has server to establish a macro-level and historic tie between labor, 
trade, and labor flexibilization as a concept that will inform a discussion of labor 
organizing in future chapters. The next chapter will look into ways in which trade has 




Chapter IV: Agribusiness, La Libertad, and Chao 
Theories of international trade are often ungrounded in time and space, discussing 
international markets as a dimensionless series of production processes, goods, and 
human capital in the form of labor. It is important to remember that globalized processes 
find roots in localized geographies of production. The effects of trade in Latin America 
have taken diverse and creative forms – language that harkens David Harvey (2007) in 
his description of the creative destruction wrought by neoliberal policies throughout the 
developing world.50 Furthermore, these processes of economic liberalization are acted 
upon by the context specific social, political and environmental particularities of place. 
There are complex interactions already at work within such spaces that, once overlaid 
with a macro-level economic reform, reorient their functions so as to best take advantage 
of the shifting framework. 
THE GROWTH OF AN INDUSTRY 
In La Libertad region, the effects of trade have fundamentally altered the 
landscape and the social fabric of a region now dominated by crops that will travel 
thousands of miles, filled with nutrients, water, and added value that will nourish 
American and European consumers. Situated on the northwest coast of Peru, La Libertad 
covers approximately 25,500 square kilometers and represents roughly two percent of the 
country’s total surface area.51 To the north lie the regions of Lambayeque (coastal), 
Cajamarca, and Amazonas. To the east, La Libertad is flanked by San Martín and to the 
south by Huánaco and Ancash (coastal). The region has Trujillo as its capital, and is 
further divided into 12 provinces and 83 districts. It is the only region in Peru that has 
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geographic features from the country’s three major ecological regions: costa, sierra y 
selva – coast, mountains (the Andes range), and jungle (the Amazon basin). The coast 
comprises 10,700 square kilometers, the mountains 13,400, and the jungle an estimated 
1,395.52 
Within Peru, La Libertad is a major player in the national economy. In 2010, it 
contributed 4.9 per cent to the national Gross Value Added (VAB), ranking third after 
Lima, which beat the playing field by leaps and bounds at 53 percent, and Arequipa at 
5.7. The relative importance of the region is even larger when the focus is narrowed to 
agriculture, where La Libertad is responsible for 11.6 percent of the national total, second 
only to Lima with 21.1 percent.53  
In recent years, the coastal provinces of La Libertad has become especially 
focused on the development of nontraditional agribusiness, producing large quantities of 
asparagus, artichoke, avocado, table grapes, and red pepper to be primarily sold onto the 
international market. The crops grown in the region were selected as being best suited to 
the region’s specific geographical and climatic characteristics, yet the decision of MNCs 
an domestic agribusiness to invest in the region was heavily contingent on the cost of 
labor, the quality and convenience of local infrastructure, and financial incentives offered 
by the regional government of La Libertad. 54 
In 2007, the growth in agricultural production was steady at 10 percent, while 
exports had grown an average of 27 percent annually between 2003 and 2007.55 Of these 
exports, it has been asparagus that has had the biggest economic impact, as nearly half of 
all agricultural exports (48 percent) of nontraditional exports from Peru last year were 
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preserved asparagus. Fresh asparagus accounted for another 13 percent, making 
asparagus responsible for 61 percent of total agro-exports.56 In the same year, the 
asparagus grown in La Libertad – and mostly only in Chao and Peru – comprised 52 
percent of the national asparagus total.57 Development of nontraditional exports on such a 
massive scale sharply contrasts the subsistence agriculture that continues to dominate the 
rural provinces of Peru with primary crops being wheat, barley, and potato. 
Within La Libertad, the majority of agricultural production is concentrated in the 
coastal province of Virú, where the cities of Chao and Virú are located and where many 
of the MNCs and domestic agribusinesses have established their headquarters and 
production facilities. The province of Virú occupies an approximate 3,215 square 
kilometers and has a population in 2011 that the INEI estimates to be 96,300.58 The 
population growth in the province between the years of 1993 and 2005 was 5.97 percent, 
the highest of any province in the region of La Libertad and nearly double that of 
Trujillo, the second fastest growing province at 2.3 percent. The regional average growth 
over the same time period was only 1.82 percent.59  
Average regional temperatures in La Libertad hover around 18C, while a mere 15 
to 20 millimeters of rain are expected on an annual basis. Forty percent of the regional 
surface area is considered apt for agricultural development.60 There are three rivers that 
run through La Libertad, forming at the western base of the Andes Mountains and 
crookedly pushing towards the Pacific Ocean through arid provincial sand dunes. The 
Rio Santa, the most relevant river to our study, provides the water that irrigates the 
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valleys of Chao, Virú, Moche, and Chicama. The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that 
52 percent of the cultivated land in the region is irrigated.61 
Although the province of Virú has historically had a stable temperature, plenty of 
sunlight, and well aerated sandy soils, the province was not agriculturally productive due 
to the frequent and extended dry periods and limited access to water by most small-scale 
farmers.  
While foreign investment would later come to drive the advancement of 
agribusiness in La Libertad, the first step towards regional transformation came with the 
advent of the mega-irrigation project Chavimochic (PECH), first signed into law in 1967 
and transferred to the Regional Government of La Libertad in 2003. The name 
CHAVIMOCHIC is an acronym that combines the names of the four valleys the project 
is intended to serve: Chao, Virú, Moche, and Chicama. The project captures the flow of 
the nearby Rio Santa, whose flow  
While the demands of the international market would later push agricultural 
growth in La Libertad, the first step in transforming the region came with the advent of 
the mega-irrigation project Chavimochic (PECH) that was first signed into law in 1967 
and transferred to the Regional Government of La Libertad in 2003. The name, a 
combination of the four valleys the project intended to serve -  Chao, Virú, Moche and 
Chicama – PECH captures the flow of the nearby Rio Santa, which is estimated to have a 
flow rate of 150 cubic meters per second and diverts water onto approximately 181,000 
hectares of farmland.  
In 2011, asparagus comprised 14,800 of those total irrigated hectares and 
accounted for 205,400 metric tons of asparagus harvested. The USDA Foreign 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
 43 
Agricultural Service (FAS) estimates that asparagus exports in Peru were worth $451 
million in 2008, $389 in 2009 during a worldwide economic downturn and $472 million 
in 2011. At 71 percent, the United States is the number one consumer of fresh Peruvian 
asparagus in 2009. The next largest consumer – the Netherlands – accounts for a mere 11 
percent.62 
AGRIBUSINESS 
These numbers reflect growth which has been driven, in large part, through the 
investment of large private investors – multinational corporations and large domestic 
conglomerates. The Fujimori regime opened Peru’s market to international competition 
and enacted a number of laws, including Law 27360 mentioned in Chapter III, which 
guaranteed private investment to match public expenditure. According to the Heritage 
Foundation, a conservative think tank, Peru currently ranks sixth among the 29 countries 
in Central and South America in turns of economic freedom, which they loosely define as 
limited government and the ease of establishing private business. The higher the level of 
economic freedom, they say, the higher and safer the foreign investment potential.63 In 
the period spanning 2012 and 2013, Proinversión, which is the branch of the Peruvian 
government that deals with foreign commerce, expects an additional $503 million in 
private investment slated specifically for two large agroindustry projects. $499 million of 
the total will go to the expansion of the Chavimochic irrigation project.64 
The problems associated with a model of economic growth that puts private 
investors at the helm have been widely documented. The concentration of wealth in 
relatively few hands and the notable withdrawal of the State raises the question of what 
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means, if any, will be responsible for carrying out the ‘trickle down’ effect held dearly in 
the hearts of privatization advocates. Labor flexibilization and the integration of Peruvian 
production with international markets mean that a market fluctuation half way around the 
world can have a felt impact in the region of La Libertad, sending workers into the streets 
with little or no cost incurred by the company who will simply rehire them when demand 
rises again.  
Although MNCs will generally invest in a diversity of crops and industries on the 
international level to insure against market swings and unanticipated natural disasters, the 
host country has no such insurance. Local operations are highly susceptible to 
international shifts in consumption and climatic events, as production is narrowly focused 
on one or a handful of crops that are grown in monoculture plantations.65 Production shifts 
can be caused by ecological disasters, international crisis – as was the case in 2009, when 
several MNCs in the valleys of Chao and Virú limited production in the midst of a 
worldwide economic downturn – as well as political or economic imbalances. Any such 
change is likely to have a major impact on the labor force, resulting in a cycle of hiring 
and firing that loosely corresponds to the demand for export-bound goods on the 
international market. This is especially true in the case of nontraditional export goods, 
which have no internal market to absorb them in the case of waning international 
demand. 
The transnational, Bourgois notes, has “often willfully promoted this employment 
instability in order to increase its bargaining power with host governments and with 
combative labor unions.”66 As Bury (2008) writes, “corporations have become the 
primary actors directing the structure and function of the global political economy,” 
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adding that the largest transnational corporations are more influential than all but a very 
small number of nation-states.67 In 2004, the top 100 transnational corporations – as 
ranked by foreign assets - controlled more than $8.8 trillion in assets, 53 percent of which 
was held in foreign countries.68 
Furthermore, scholars have identified a growing need to study the behavior of 
corporations in local contexts. Bury (2008) states that “TNCs are intricately embedded in 
territories with distinct physical and human geographies with complex histories.”69 In the 
case of Chao, whose residents find themselves increasingly living under the banners and 
inside the uniforms of large corporations, such a relationship merits further investigation. 
The town of Chao has found itself at the confluence of ideal conditions. Macro-level 
economic forces have lowered trade barriers and eased the entrance of foreign capital into 
La Libertad; simultaneously, the fertile soils of the coastal desert (see Figure 1) have 
allowed nontraditional exports to flourish and the geographic positioning of the valleys 
have drawn thousands of migrant workers from the region’s inner provinces. The town, 
which has grown from 10,000 to 25,000 over the last 15 years is a case study on – to use 
Thomas Friedman’s words – the “two most powerful disciplining forces on the planet”: 
Mother Nature and the free market.70 
CAMPOSOL 
In the long list of multinational and domestic agribusinesses that made La 
Libertad their home over the last 15 years, this study will focus on one in particular. 
Camposol S.A., a Peruvian business registered in Norway and traded on the Oslo stock 
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exchange, is currently the largest agribusiness in the northern region of La Libertad and, 
in the last 15 years, has become the largest asparagus exporter in the world. A third of the 
company is help by Dyer and Coriat Holding SL (D&C Holding SL), a large company 
managed by the Dyer family. The next largest investor is Deutche Bank, who holds 
approximately eight percent. 
The company was incorporated in 1997, when it first bought land in La Libertad. 
The company’s executive chairman, Samuel Barnaby Dyer Coriat, is a member of the 
powerful Dyer family, well known in Peruvian business. The Deputy Chairman, Samuel 
Dyer Ampudia, is the founding shareholder of COPINCA, Calvanizadora Peruana S.A., 
Aceros y Techos S.A., Consorcio Latinoamericano S.A. and Ferreteria Dyer S.A., among 
others. He is also the Chairman of the Board of the D&C Group – often referred to as the 
Figure 1: An asparagus field in Camposol's Fonda la Gloria outside of Chao. 
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Dyer Group. As an aside, the elder Samuel Dyer was kidnapped under orders from 
Fujimori in 1992, a crime that was listed as one of four sentences (44 years total) dealt by 
Chile in approving the ex-president’s extradition to Chile. 71 
According to their 2011 Annual Report, Camposol is estimated to be worth 
$167.8 million.72 As a relatively young agribusiness, incorporated 15 years ago, 
Camposol specializes in nontraditional exports such as artichoke, red pepper, mangoes, 
avocadoes and asparagus, which continues to be their highest earning crop. In the low 
season, Camposol estimates that they employ 7,000 workers in La Libertad; during the 
high season, that number jumps to more than 10,000.73 The success of Camposol has 
been hard to refute on paper, as the growth of the company in 2011 was 40 percent 
greater than that of 2010, a statistic reflected in ever-increasing stock value.74  
Yet in recent years, the company has been the focus of international and national 
labor disputes and domestic lawsuits that have raised questions as to the social cost of a 
widely successful agribusiness.  
In 2008, the Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos filed a moral sanction against 24 
European and American corporations operating in Latin America that they found to be in 
violation of international rights. Three corporations operating in Peru made the list: 
Monterrico Metals, Bayer, and Camposol. Camposol was sanctioned for what the 
Tribunal found to be a systematic dismissal of unionized workers, a clear violation of 
workers’ rights to association and the right to organize. Furthermore, the Tribunal 
contended that such corporations deserved a high level of scrutiny, as the neoliberal 
models that have encouraged their investment in the region were “implemented and 
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permitted by the States and the EU under the ruse of promoting economic growth and 
development to combat poverty and achieve sustainable development.”75  
This treatment of corporations as agents of change, as noted in Bury (2008) calls 
for a more complex evaluation of their behavior as corporations and their commitment to 
so-called corporate social responsibility. “Scholars need to generate rich organizational 
ethnographies that examine the structure and behavior of corporate entities,” he adds.76 
Although corporations necessarily interact with market and state actors, they are also 
responsible to civil society, despite their operations being clearly guided by the logic of 
capital accumulation.77 
As noted by Fernández-Maldonado (2007), who writes about job insecurity and 
corporate culture in Peru, “the strength of the argument for corporate social responsibility 
lies in the possibility of a “good” or “healthy” capitalism … as opposed to a “savage” or 
unsustainable capitalism that exploits workers, cheats its clients, and destroys the 
environment without considering the implications of its actions for the middle to long-
term.”78 As we will discuss in the following section, the role of the State is important in 
this conversation, as recent trends in labor relations have been dominated by a discourse 
in which companies are increasingly expected to self-regulate and promote, in their own 
interest, sustainable social, labor, and environmental policies.79  
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
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“Si en un barrio de delincuentes hay tres policías, es un incentivo para violar los 
derechos.” 
- Javier Mujica Petit   
Historically, the Peruvian State has acted as a mediator in relations between 
capital and labor, guiding collective negotiations, making important decisions, and 
sanctioning companies that have failed to follow the established rules.80 It was under the 
Velasco regime that the first concrete efforts to promote labor rights and protect workers 
were made by the State, though most decisions with regards to labor conflicts were made 
“desde arriba” without the involvement of labor as part of the political process. As a 
result, few of the advancements made with the State as mediator reflected the agenda of 
the labor unions but rather symbolic concessions made by the State.81 
As noted by Arciniega (1996), the State has historically recognized a certain 
disability among its working subjects to resolve their differences, further encouraging this 
tendency by limiting their capacity to participate in processes of resolution. This lead to 
increased interventionism that problematized agreement processes rather than facilitating 
them. Rather than building consensus, she adds, this institutional model has had the effect 
of stifling the power of workers’ organization and participation, effectively keeping the 
working class from becoming social and political actors.82 
In recent years, and as part of the general prescriptions associated with neoliberal 
policies, the Peruvian State has largely withdrawn from labor disputes, playing now only 
the peripheral role in receiving individual labor complaints and ruling as to the legality of 
organized protests. As noted by Vanderburgh and Liu, the Peruvian State has returned its 
focus to its role as a facilitator of export-led development based on natural resources and 
                                                 




agricultural goods.83 The absence of the State in questions of capital and labor have 
meant that such conflicts are more likely to be handled on the level of the private 
employer and less likely to be addressed through a national political system.  
The Peruvian State has been criticized for creating a legal and economic 
framework that panders to private development at the cost of labor and environmental 
protections. In questions of labor rights, unions and labor advocates point to the creation 
of Law 27360 (discussed above) as a primary example of misguided state priorities. The 
law was passed under Fujimori in 2000, when José Chlimper, a business man in the agro-
export industry, was the acting Minister of Agriculture. When the law was set to expire, 
in 2006, an additional law was passed extending its validity through 2021. Alliances 
between private capital and the State have become further entrenched with the passing of 
the PTPA in 2006 and the preceding ATPDEA. 
The withdrawal of the State has also been linked to the high number of Peruvian 
workers operating in the informal economy. According to the ILO (2009), 70 percent of 
the Peruvian workforce is working in the informal economy. 84 One of the results of a 
large informal economy is the a reduction of state revenue that could provide potentially 
constructive services. In terms of labor, a reduction of state revenue has been linked to 
dwindling numbers of inspectors and officials who are specifically tasked with the 
protection of labor rights. In a report published in 2007, Fernández-Maldonado notes that 
“According to the ILO, the best indicators for showing this reality are the State’s capacity 
to oversee working conditions, such as number of labor inspectors and number of 
workers and companies each inspector has to cover.”85 
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The director of the Regional Ministry of Labor (RML) in Trujillo, José Ferradas 
Caballero, stated that it was the goal of his office to protect the rights of workers as 
outlined in the national legal framework. Since 2008, he has been at the head of the 
Regional Ministry of Labor and the Regional Labor Council (RLC), a body that he 
describes as an open table for dialogue across regional industries. Through this council, 
the RML works directly with the CGTP, the CTP, and the CUT, the three biggest 
umbrella unions in the country, the representatives of local unions, company 
representatives, large investment groups, and the Chamber of Commerce of Trujillo.  
The Regional Ministry of Labor had 109 meetings to mediate conflicts between 
workers and employers in 2009. According to Ferradas, La Libertad leads the country in 
such “extra proceso” meetings which have the effect of resolving conflicts before they 
reach the level of a strike. On whether this number indicated a high level of discontent 
among laborers or a highly active regional government presence in resolving a moderate 
amount of discontent was not directly addressed, though he did note that most conflicts 
stemmed from calls for higher wages, complaints about “los famosos descansos 
temporales,” and greater respect for organizing rights. 
In June of 2010, Ferradas and other representatives of the RLC had a meeting to 
discuss the ongoing conflicts surrounding Law 27360, the overturning of which was 
identified by the CGTP as a priority the same year. “Maybe at the moment it was passed, 
the wages given in Law 27360 were adequate,” he said. “But as the years have gone on, 
we need to consider if these are wages that are fair and viable for workers.” He noted that 
there was a general sentiment among the RLC and the RML that the law needed to be 
reviewed and revised. 
“There was a reason to implement that law after Chavimochic was built,” 
Ferradas said. “We needed a law that promoted investment, but since that has been 
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completed, the economic conditions of the workers have not increased in the same way 
that those who made the private investments have.”  
He added that the capacity for the RML to enact change in the plantations was 
limited by the fact that big decisions – such as the decision to alter the minimum wage 
paid to agricultural workers – were made by a centralized government in Lima with little 
consideration for regional variation. Furthermore, he explained that the resources 
allocated to the RML were ever-shrinking, as the State’s role in labor relations had been 
reduced in recent years. “We have 11 inspectors that cover the entire region of La 
Libertad,” he said. “Our resources are stretched incredibly thin, and those inspectors are 
the ones who are responsible for monitoring the labor conditions of workers.” 
Alexis Rebasa, the vice-president of the Region of La Libertad, believed that state 
intervention had improved conditions for workers, adding that national policies had 
moved too far in favor of business. “National legislation has been conceived to benefit 
the businessman,” he said. “It hardly protects the agricultural worker.” While admitting 
that it was important to keep agribusiness in the region, he hoped that the regional 
government could work with companies towards a “trato más humano.” 
A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR LA LIBERTAD 
The promotion of nontraditional-oriented agribusiness, such as that which has 
come to dominate the region of La Libertad, was intended relieve debts that had been 
incurred during the phase of import-substitution. As the employment opportunities in La 
Libertad were limited to those in the city of Trujillo prior to the implementation of 
Chavimochic, agribusiness has been revered for the creation of tens of thousands of jobs. 
And although such numbers are an important indication of the impact of the industry, it is 
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equally necessary to understand how these statistics interact with other indicators of 
social wellbeing and economic progress.  
Historically, Peru has shown indicators of extreme inequality. Richard Webb, 
who is believed to have first documented this in 1961, found that Peru had the same Gini 
coefficient (.61) as Brazil.86 In 2009, Peru had a Gini coefficient of 49.1, slightly better 
than Paraguay (51.0), Brazil (54.7), and Bolivia (56.3).87 In 2008, it was estimated that 
17.3 percent of La Libertad was without income, while 41 percent earned less than 500 
soles ($190) a month and 23 percent earned between 500 and 999.9 ($190-382) soles a 
month.88 In 2005, 24 percent of La Libertad was still without water, 19 percent was 
without any sort of sewage system, and 30 percent was without electricity.89 
The promise of free trade, foreign investment, and the development of 
agribusiness in La Libertad was a project promoted in terms of job creation. The three 
stated goals of the Regional Ministry of Agriculture of La Libertad are the following: To 
correct the failures of the market, to reduce poverty, and to contribute to the conservation 
of the natural environment. Furthermore, their 2008 Strategic Plan states that “if it is true 
that agriculture is growing in a sustainable manner due to the dynamism of the economy 
and market liberalization, what we have found is a sector with low levels of agricultural 
and rural development that needs to improve itself in order to better take advantage of the 
opportunities that this has created.”90  
Under a general heading labeled “Low Life Quality,” the Ministry recognized 
“Dependency and Food Insecurity,” “Migration Rural to Urban,” and “Rural Poverty and 
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Exclusion” as the three major problems.91 However, the only one of the three problems 
that the report addresses is migration, proposing measures that would keep rural 
populations from moving to cities. 
CHAO: “DISTRITO ECOLÓGICO CAPITAL DE LA AGROINDUSTRIA” 
The Panamericana, 10 meters in width, effectively divides the town of plantation 
workers into two parts: High Chao and Low Chao. Between them, semis haul the bounty 
of La Libertad towards the port of Lima, more than 550 kilometers to the south. Trailers 
hauling chicken, cows, pineapple and asparagus up and down the Peruvian coast slow as 
they pass through the town of Chao, but few stop. Occasionally, these trundling masses 
roll down their windows and toss a quick coin into the hand of a grateful sidewalk vendor 
who promptly tosses a bag of peanuts, chicken legs, or Satsuma oranges in return. To the 
west, coastal sand dunes glow under the bright Peruvian sunshine, soft castles jutting out 
towards the sea. To the east, the foothills of the Andes, the longest mountain range in the 
world, carefully protrude from the cultivated land.  
Hostal El Milagro is a precariously built four-story concrete building on the south 
side of the Panamericana, sandwiched between mixed commercial residential buildings 
of the same material. From the top of El Milagro, which is the tallest of the immediately 
adjacent buildings, the skyline of Chao looks like a construction project abandoned 
without notice. While the ground floor of every building serves a clear commercial 
purpose – a pharmacy, feed store, or clothing exchange – the second, third, and 
occasional fourth story of each structure appears as a mosaic of varying material, the 
colors of textures changing as more material was bought and added. Impromptu clothing 
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lines are strung from protruding rebar on rooftops in all directions, with several 
ramshackle chicken coops visible in the cracks between buildings. 
The rooftop of El Milagro is completely exposed, bright and hot in the desert 
sunshine that usually casts an intense heat onto Chao and the surrounding desert at 1 or 
2pm after spending most of the morning behind a thick cloud cover. A rickety ladder 
leads from the rooftop to the fourth floor and is grounded on a dimly lit lineoleum-
covered hallway with no windows. It is only when workers open the doors to their room 
that a brief slice of light enters the central walkways. In any given week, El Milagro 
houses between 25 and 30 workers employed by the companies that surround Chao. Each 
pays roughly $50 a month for their lodging, a room that cozily fits a twin bed and a few 
sorted belongings. The doors to their rooms had no markings, and few workers who 
invited me into their rooms had much in the way of decoration. An occasional photo or 
poster was pasted to the wall, but most workers had arrived with little and acquired little 
since.  
The owner of the hostal, a man named Juan Luís, had emigrated from the Andes 
two years prior to my first visit in 2010. He was a quiet man, frail and measuring in at 
just over five feet. Juan Luís and his family had moved for the same reason cited by most 
workers: economic opportunities on the coast far outnumbered those in the more interior 
reaches of La Libertad. Upon arrival, his wife had quickly accepted a job in one of the 
many plantations, which were attracting immigrants at astounding rates through social 
and family networks and formal recruiting practices. Due to physical limitations of his 
own, Juan Luís did not seek work in the agroindustry but instead opened his own 
business to serve those that would.  
Juan Luís and his wife are just two of what the Municipality of Chao estimates to 
be more than 10,000 migrants who have moved to the city in the last 15 years. The 
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Peruvian asparagus boom has been estimated to employ 60,000 workers nationwide. In 
the towns of Chao and Virú, it has created secondary employment opportunities in sectors 
that support agribusiness, such as the housing industry and the case of El Milagro. 
Chao is a young town by Peruvian standards. While the official population in 
2011, according to INEI, is just over 25,000, it was not even two decades before that the 
landscape was dominated by empty, arid valleys and that the economic prospects were a 
reason to leave, not a reason to come.92 
Olga Hernandez, the City Manager of Chao, remembers what the valley was like 
before the agroboom. “The water arrived for the first time in 1988,” she said. “In 1994 
the companies started to come as well.” There was capital that arrived from all over the 
world, she explained. Venezuelans, Colombians, and Spaniards consolidated into what is 
now Dyer Group, the parent company of Camposol. In her interview, she explained the 
evolution of the valley of Chao:  
 
Chao didn’t have an urban scene before. And despite that, it has managed to 
receive and hold thousands of people, people that come asking that their basic 
needs be met. (…) There was a lot of delinquency that came in those growing 
years – gangs, drug dealing, and death. The social impact of this development was 
neither foreseen nor planned. We decided that we were going to do this project 
and then we left it up to luck. A lot of people that were working on farmland 
before gave that up and went to work for the companies. The growth has 
converted those workers into peons. They have a meager salary, and it’s not stable 
(…) Chao has received roughly 10,000 immigrants, and they come with illnesses 
that we can’t treat – tropical illnesses, for example. (…) The State, it must be 
recognized, has failed to do an adequate job of planning – the social impact was 
not planned for and no one imagined what was going to happen. 
 
Faustino, whose father worked in a sugar cane haciendas prior to the agrarian 
reform of 1969, has also been witness to this transformation. “Before, Chao was a town 
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of 20 or 25 families. Now, almost everyone who works in the agribusiness rents a house 
here in town.” While he agrees that the agroindustry has provided economic opportunities 
for workers that have flooded a town struggling to provide adequate infrastructure, he had 
no illusions about ‘the good old days.’ “It has helped everything to evolve,” he said. 
“Now most of these houses are made of material noble and people here have improved 
their quality of life.” 
On the outskirts of Chao, Nuevo Chao, and Virú, there are visible indications that 
these once small communities have not been able to contain the effects of a quickly 
changing economic landscape. What Peruvians commonly call “invasiones” (see Figure 
2) could also be called impromptu communities or shanty towns. These invasiones, where 
there is no running water, no electricity, and no means by which to dispose of human 
Figure 2: An invasión on the outskirts of Chao. 
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waste, an increasing number of agroindustry workers are making their home. They are 
perhaps the most visible indication of failed state planning for rapid growth surrounding 
the industry.   
While migration within the region of La Libertad has historically been directed 
from the rural Amazonian and Andean extensions of the region towards the capital city of 
Trujillo, the agroindustry has created a new destination for rural and urban migrants in 
the valleys of Virú and Chao. Such rapid migration has led to a number of challenges for 
the State, as they struggle to provide basic resources to a growing population. 
Discussions of migration across international borders often include the 
establishment at the destination – in the presence of the migrant – institutions that can 
protect and create an infrastructure for those migrants. The same is true to a certain extent 
with internal migrants. The regional government of La Libertad has struggled to provide 
the services and infrastructure necessary to accommodate the rapidly growing 
communities surrounding plantations in Chao in Virú. 
Nuevo Chao, which grew as an extension community to Chao, only got water and 
electricity in the last few years and in 2011 a school had recently been erected. The 
capacity of local schools has been stretched to accommodate a rapid influx of migrants 
and their children. One of the oldest elementary schools in Chao – now one of three – has 
1,015 students in its high school and 1,130 in elementary school. In 1993, the school had 
10 rooms, 25 teachers, and a total of 450 students between the elementary and high 
schools. While the number of students in each classroom has grown, the overall quality of 
the education has diminished. Manuel, the director of the elementary school in question, 
explains that while classroom sizes have grown, the welfare of students has diminished. 
“We estimate that between 40 to 60 percent of students now are malnourished,” 
said Marcos, sub-director of the school. “Capacity depends on proper nutrition,” added 
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Manuel, “and with the 20 soles a day that workers are receiving, you can’t cover food for 
seven. This has had a major effect on the levels of education in the region.”  
Aside from the quality of life available to those living in plantation towns, many 
workers are unable to find places to live. The general explanation for the growth of such 
invasiones is the lack of adequate housing in the towns that have already taken on 
thousands of new immigrants in recent years. The term ‘adequate’, however, does not 
only refer to the availability of housing, though that is the primary concern that was cited 
by workers. In addition to there being a simple lack of vacancy in hotels and apartment 
buildings, the wages that workers are earning are poor – and not guaranteed, at that – a 
fact that keeps many workers from being able to secure housing. 
Karin and Clara, two young women who both previously worked for Camposol, 
now live in the invasión outside of Nuevo Chao. “It is out of necessity that I live here,” 
said Karin. Her husband was fired from Camposol in 2005 after he was recorded on video 
as having walked out of work during a strike. He was affiliated with SITECASA, but 
Karin insists that he wasn’t participating in the strike. Clara (see Figure 3), whose 
husband still works in Camposol, had to leave the company when she got pregnant.  Now 
that her son is older, she hopes to return to work as a secretary soon. 
Luís is the vice-president of the regional Chamber of Commerce, located in 
Trujillo, and the manager of one of the valley’s agribusinesses. “There should be role for 
the State in all this,” he said. "The companies are always going to help, but [basic needs] 
are the primary job of the state.” 
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“Not even those who pushed for this to happen thought it was going to grow this 
much,” said Sandra, a representative from the Regional Ministry of Labor. “The 
companies are helping out with sports complexes, schools, and things that will lead to the 
development of those communities,” she said. “Little by little, we are finding 
equilibrium, and not only in questions of labor but social concerns, too.” The head of the 
Regional Ministry of Labor, José Ferradas, explained that the State was effectively 
limited by the money allocated on the national level. “We see all labor complaints here in 
this office,” he said, acknowledging that they were really an office for labor dispute 
settlement and that he couldn’t answer questions about social equality.  
Figure 3: Clara with her son and neighbor in one of the reed invasión houses. 
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Alexis Rebasa, the vice-president of the Region of La Libertad, implied that 
national policies were allowing companies to benefit from the region’s abundant labor 
supply without adequate compensation. “What the State has legislated with respect to the 
agricultural salary [Law 27360] is – I think – particularly low given the large investments 
and profits that these companies are making,” he said. “There is currently some discord 
between the free trade agreement that we signed with the United States and the law of 
agricultural promotion.” In the words of Camposol worker Enrique: “With that Law in 
place, you can’t advance one bit.” 
This concern was shared by Pablo Cuba, a labor lawyer based in Trujillo who in 
his 22 working years has taken on a number of cases involving workers at Camposol and 
other MNCs. “In 2001, they passed the Law 27360, incentivizing private investment in 
these arid lands,” he said. “The companies go up into the mountains to bring workers to 
the coast, but once they are brought here it doesn’t matter to them whether those workers 
live or die.” He cited job insecurity, arduous labor conditions, and cultural displacement 
among the biggest challenges for workers.  
 
“The expectations that they give workers are false. Once they are out of work, 
delinquency rates increase. These companies are incubating this process. They’re 
working de sol a sol, but no one asks [workers] if they would like to return to 
their own land … and now, with this Law, there are limited benefits available to 
workers. The Constitutional Tribunal says that it can’t weigh in on questions of 
discrimination, even though the Colegio de Abogados de Ica found the law to be 
unconstitutional. This further foments inequality. There is absolutely no policy 
that makes [the companies] responsible for the same poverty that they are 
creating.” 
 
The Quiet Nights of Isabel  
 
 “Please excuse the poverty,” Isabel said. 
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She paused, looked to her right and left, and then used both hands to push in the 
large wooden door that would open into the single room that served as her living room, 
bedroom, and kitchen. She turned on the single bulb hanging from the ceiling, revealing a 
nearly empty room. “My neighbors and I look out for 
one another,” she said, acknowledging that the blocks 
surrounding her house in High Chao weren’t especially 
safe. Once the door was closed, we could hear 
firecrackers exploding in the street, a sure sign that 
Independence Day was approaching. It was 8pm. At 
430am, Isabel would wake, pull on her Camposol 
uniform, and start her morning walk back to the bus 
station. It would be nearly 630am before the sun came 
up over the foothills of the Andes and onto the lush and 
irrigated crops of Chao valley. 
In 1998, Isabel migrated to Chao with her mother and three children. Friends in 
the area had told her of abundant jobs in the plantation and she had no trouble getting 
immediately hired in the plant shortly after arriving. For years, her mother and children 
had filled her now empty room with laughter, food, books, and clothes. She had brought 
them with her, she said, in search of a better future. “So they don’t end up like me,” she 
said. Her husband kept his job in Chimbote, an hour south of Chao, where he was a well-
paid taxi driver. After years of living apart and her husband coming to visit the rest of the 
family in Chao on the weekends, her mother moved to Lima, giving her no option but to 
take her children back to her husband’s family in Chimbote.  
“They usually call me between eight and nine,” she said, glancing occasionally at 
her dark cell phone lying on the dining room table. “It makes us feel like we’re closer 
Figure 4: Isabel, 2011. 
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than we are,” she said, her own words seemingly hard for her to hear. She grew quiet, 
holding back tears. “It’s difficult, you know?” she continued. “But there is really no other 
way.”  
Like countless other workers that fill the plantations of the northern Peruvian 
coast, Isabel had never imagined a life away from her family. She had not imagined 
herself working on a plantation, waking up in an empty house, or starting her day by 
pulling on the same Camposol uniform. “Your body gets used to it,” she said. “And in 
recent years, they have been treating us better.”  
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Chapter V: Foreign Capital and Interior Migration 
As foreign capital has migrated into Chao at an ever-increasing rate, so too have 
migrants from neighboring regions. The role of the migrant in La Libertad agroindustry 
lends itself to important discussions of social networks and nontraditional export 
production systems, as well as the gendered and ethnic lines along which arriving 
migrants are divided in the workplace and in their recently found communities. The high 
volume of migrants working in the fields and factories of La Libertad also raises 
questions about internal and south-south migration as opposed to dominant discourses 
that have focused on south-north migration paths. 
According to Grasmuck (1983), the unequal processes of development in the rural 
global south have created conditions that have led to both the displacement and need for 
labor.93 Similarly, Massey and Capoferro (2006) note that under import-substitution 
policies, jobs with sustaining wages were available while under neoliberalism, 
employment opportunities and wages fell in a way that forced families to diversify their 
labor portfolios beyond the local labor market.94 The growth of agribusiness on the coast 
of Peru has depended upon such displacement, as the workers that have fueled the rapid 
growth of the industry are largely characterized as resource-poor migrant workers.  
Workers who migrate to the coast of Peru generally follow two mechanisms: 
social networks and recruiting practices. In the discussion that follows, we will see that 
whether workers came to agribusiness through the former or latter appears to have some 
implication for their permanence in the valleys of Chao and Virú, their workplace 
determination, and their involvement with labor organizing activities.  
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The first migration mechanism corresponds to those migrants who came to the 
coast by way of social networks and capital. Perhaps the more organic of the two 
processes, the important role of social networks in migration has been well documented 
by migration scholars. The first premise of network theory, as outlined by Lee (2010), is 
that social ties provide the mechanism for linking and channeling migrants from their 
origin to their destination. This connection minimizes risks and costs associated with 
obtaining information, housing, and employment opportunities in the destination region. 
Such networks also facilitate upward movement once the migrant has arrived to their 
destination, as incorporation into existing social networks increases the economic 
security and likelihood for success among migrants.95 
Such concepts are evidenced in the communities of Chao and Virú, where several 
workers have come to live with family and members of their place of origin networks. A 
field worker from Camposol, Emiliano moved from Huamachuco with his wife nearly 
four years ago. “My wife’s sister and her husband lived here,” he explained. “We lived 
with them for three years while I worked in the plantations before we found our own 
place.” 
Marisa, who was born in Piura, came to Virú years after her husband and sister 
had come to work on the plantations. “They were already here, and they said I could find 
work,” she said. “I brought my son and my sister’s child to live with us, and now I work 
with my sister in the field.” Her husband has since left to Lima, but Marisa has remarried, 
and claims that her son – now 15 – can cook, clean, and do everything that she can no 
longer do while working in the plantations. 
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“I was practically without work in Motupe,” said Ignacio, in his 50s, noting that 
his farm back home hadn’t gotten good rain in years. “When my daughter came to the 
plantations, I called a friend who lived here to see if there was work. He said yes, and I 
came after her to see what she was doing.” He now works in Camposol doing carpentry 
and maintenance work. Like Emiliano, Marisa, and Ignacio, many other workers cited a 
family member as a primary reason for moving to work in agribusiness.  
Although the dominant framework in migration studies have focused on the 
importance of social ties through kinship or community, migration scholars have often 
overlooked the importance of labor recruitment. Labor recruiting practices, according to 
Lee (2010), have greatly stimulated migration by lowering the costs and risks and 
perpetuating constant motion.96 The need for a large seasonal workforce, as discussed in 
previous sections, is an inherent characteristic of agribusiness.  
Labor recruitment is a commonly recognized practice among agribusinesses 
operating in La Libertad. Camposol officials, in a 2011 interview, acknowledged that 
recruiting laborers from other provinces was the only way they could cover their labor 
demands. In exchange for a three month commitment by workers, the company offered 
housing, food, and free transport to their company headquarters in Chao. In 2011, the 
company was constructing a large campamento where they expected to house thousands 
of additional workers coming through recruitment mechanisms. 
“We have to go to other provinces to meet our needs,” said Alberto, a public 
relations officer for Camposol, “but we’ve always had a plan of where to put them.” If 
the company cannot put them in the campamentos provided on site, it is common that 
they contract housing with private operations throughout Chao and Virú. 
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Several young workers living in El Milagro explained the relative ease with 
which they came with the company from rural provinces in the selva and the sierra. 
“They took my blood, had me sign a contract, and brought me to Chao,” said Montoya, 
only 19 years old. “I wanted to see other parts of the country, and they promised me 
housing and food.” What originally seemed like an irresistible offer resulted in a reality 
that was less than he had hoped. “It turns out that only the dinner is free – they take the 
rest out of your paycheck,” he said.  
Ricardo, another worker living in El Milagro, came from Pucallpa. “I came here 
to tempt fate,” he said. “I wanted to know a new environment.” He described the 
recruitment process in similar terms, as a mere formality for those looking for 
employment. “They asked for my blood, a urine sample, a few documents, and here I 
was.” He came with more than 200 other workers in a bus paid for by the company and 
although he had been with Camposol for nearly seven months, he hoped to move on 
soon. “Things aren’t what I expected,” he said. “When we arrived, they put us 10 to a 
room and treated us like animals. They tell you they’ll give you housing for a month, and 
I was enthusiastic until I realized it wasn’t true.” 
He was just over 20 years in age, young and far away from home. “My parents 
think I’m doing okay, but the truth is I’m not happy,” he said. “I supposedly came here to 
find a better life, and I don’t want to worry them.” The words of Ricardo reflected a 
sentiment that was shared by many who had come from distant provinces through 
recruitment mechanisms “It’s chocante when you come from far away, leaving 
everything behind,” he said. “Those who have spent more time here have better 
connections – family or someone to support them.”  
It was a process that was also reflected in the words of workers who were native 
to the region, understanding that immigrants inherently faced much greater challenges 
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than those who had social networks to support them. “Immigrants who come alone have 
everything to lose,” said Jorge, a native of Chao and long-time worker at Camposol. “If 
the company fires them, they take off, while those from here or who have someone here 
have options.” 
ETHNICITY IN PERU 
While ethnicity emerged as a dominant theme in this study, ethnicity is not 
recognized by the Peruvian census. The nearest proxy that is used in discussions of 
ethnicity is native language but, because native tongue is not a direct indication of origin, 
there is little official data that would allow patterns of inequality to emerge along ethnic 
lines. Some authors (see Figueroa and Barrón, 2005) have used history and geography as 
a proxy for ethnicity, though large provincial cities were excluded from their studies and 
labeled as blanket ‘mestizo.’97  
Muñoz, Paredes, and Thorp (2007) note that common discourse in Peru doesn’t 
recognize ethnicity as a determinant but is more likely to recognize class, regional, or 
occupational divisions.98 One potential implication of this, as Glidden (2011) suggests in 
her work, is that ethnically-based social movement have had much more success in 
countries such as Ecuador as compared to Peru. She attributes this, at least partially, to 
ethnic  movements being pre-emptively co-opted by other actors (the State under Velasco 
and the Sendero Luminoso), the strength of the class-oriented left, and the fact that those 
provinces with the largest indigenous populations are far from Lima, reached by way of 
challenging topography.99 
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The last half century in Peru has not given rise to any predominantly ethnic-based 
social movement. The Sendero Luminoso was rejected by large portions of the Peruvian 
population, including the indigenous population, for its violent and authoritarian 
tendencies. Yet, ethnicity was a clear indicator in the way that the violence in this period 
was committed.100 The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which published 
its final document in 2003, noted that 75% of the victims killed in the war spoke an 
indigenous language. The Commission’s proxy for ethnicity was language which, 
although not a perfect indication of ethnicity, can be a useful statistic when one considers 
that only 16% of the total population spoke an indigenous language in the 1993 census.101 
ETHNIC TENSIONS IN CHAO 
In the process of collecting data for this study, it became evident that while 
ethnicity was not formally recognized as a defining characteristic by the Peruvian 
authorities, it was an issue that community members and workers alike talked about with 
a great sense of verity. In my interviews as well as in conversations overheard in the 
communities of Chao and Virú, it was clear that ethnicity was something that guided, to 
some extent, relationships between migrant groups. 
In one of my first interviews, a young worker walking along the Panamericana 
commented to me, “I don’t know if you’ve realized this, but Chao has become a little 
Peru.” I acknowledged the comment in passing, as my study had originally been focused 
on the expression of labor rights, but the theme returned in a number of later 
conversations. The implications of ethnic diversity for labor rights will be discussed 
below, after a broad overview of the way in which residents of Chao and Virú talked 
about places of origin. 
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Ethnic tensions have found a stage for performance in the communities that have 
grown around the agribusinesses of La Libertad. While migration has exacted a clear 
social cost for the entire populations of Chao and Virú, the blame for social problems did 
not appear to be cast equally onto all ethnic groups. Those migrants from the sierra and 
the selva were cited in numerous interviews as being problematic for reasons traced to 
differing cultural practices and values. While such sentiments were most commonly 
expressed by those who were from the coast or had lived in the area for an extended 
period of time, similar comments were also made by those who had come from the sierra 
or the selva about their regional compatriots. 
“The good never grows without the bad,” said Isabel, the night after an orange 
juice vendor had been shot in broad daylight along the side of the Panamericana. Much 
of the seemingly senseless violence in Chao and Virú, she explained, seemed to be the 
result of territorial disputes among migrants. “The majority of those who come from the 
selva have some tie to drugs,” she said. “Young recruited workers don’t tolerate the 
exploitation as well as other workers and they hit the streets. That’s why we have this 
delinquency.”  
Marcos, who has worked for 18 years as the sub-director at an elementary school 
in Chao, noted that teen pregnancy, drop-out rates, and violence had increased in recent 
years. “[Migrants] come with a different way of thinking – and that brings problems,” he 
said. “The youth that come engages in sexual activity very young – at 15, 16, 17. They 
get pregnant and then we have to accommodate them, giving them tests at another time of 
year, etc.” 
Originally from Cajamarca, Fernando had worked as an insect biologist with 
Camposol for several years. “Quality of life is a function of the habits that you live by,” 
he said. “If you come from the sierra, you live in disorder – you don’t clean yourself 
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much – and once you have that habit, you bring it with you here.” And that, he said, is 
“despite the fact that there is work and detergent here in Chao.” 
Those who had migrated from the sierra were further discounted in conversation 
for their perceived low levels of education. “We have found that those who come from 
the sierra are very rural (son muy del campo) and they lack an adequate preparation,” 
said Marcos, again referring to the parents he has interacted with in his capacity as school 
administrator. “If they come from the cities, they’re a little better, but the rural serranos 
are the worst.” 
ETHNIC DIVISIONS OF LABOR 
The role of ethnicity in the development of agribusiness is multi-faceted. As this 
study has established that a large portion of the workforce employed in the fields and 
factories of agribusiness in La Libertad has come through migratory mechanisms, it is 
important to recognize the role that ethnicity plays in the lives of these workers once they 
have arrived. 
The use of social networks – kinship and community ties – among migrants often 
results in what Portes (1989) deemed the “ethnic enclave,” a term used to describe 
pockets of working migrants that form along lines of origin.102 
As Wright and Ellis have described, ethnic forms of social capital also help 
workers to use networks associated with place of birth ties. In their analysis, they 
conclude that while specific training and acquired skills are effective in creating job 
opportunities for migrant, social capital is far more important in securing those workers a 
job. Social capital, they claim, goes “further in unpacking large-scale patterns in the 
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industrial division of labor.”103 Aside from facilitating the movement of migrants from 
one geographical area to another, these networks also serve to channel these workers into 
similar occupations, further defining the ethnic enclave to a specific job category. 
Human resources representatives at Camposol not only recognized that such 
patterns were at play in their factories and in their fields, but said that it is the overt 
policy of Camposol to organize workers in the workplace according to place of origin. 
“When we bring a group of workers, we keep them together,” said Alan, human 
resources director for Camposol. The policy, he added, was intended to minimize the 
adverse effects of relocation on the migrant community and to encourage cultural 
solidarity.  
At Camposol, this meant putting recruited workers into factory jobs while 
providing them housing in the campamentos mentioned earlier. By keeping recruited 
workers close to the factory, the company maintained greater control over their 
movement and reduced risks that were associated with workers living off company 
quarters and beyond supervision.  
“All of the workers for our last campaña came from the selva,” said Alan.. “That 
new campamento that we built alongside the factory, it should hold almost 11,000 
workers in better conditions than they have ever had previously.” The housing provided 
for those recruited from more distant regions has the effect of dividing the housing 
facilities among ethnic lines as well. 
Isabel, who has worked on and off in the factory for the last 13 years, added that 
“The workers that come into the factory are by and large from the selva and the sierra.” 
Over the years, she has seen large groups of recruited workers move through the factory. 
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“[The company] goes to recruit people from the sierra 300 or 400 at a time,” adding that 
few of the factory workers stay beyond their short-term contract and that becoming close 
with new factory workers was difficult for that reason.  
Given the company’s desire to keep workers together according to place of origin, 
and given that recruiting practices bring large numbers of workers from the same place of 
origin into almost unanimously factory jobs, the ethnic division of labor quickly formed 
around task specification. Factory workers were for the most part those who had come to 
Chao through recruitment practices and were, therefore, more often from rural provinces 
in the sierra and selva, which corresponded to higher levels of indigeneity. 
“All those tarps next to the plant are for workers that they bring from far away,” 
said Ignacio, a maintenance worker. “If you walk into the factory, you can tell by all the 
different dialects you hear.” 
Here I will return briefly to the work of Soja (1983), who suggests that employer-
created ethnic divisions of labor in the workplace may serve the purpose of dissuading 
cooperation among workers, pitting groups organized by place of origin in competition 
with one another. Such tactics are echoed by Bourgois (1989), who documented the 
United Fruit Company’s use of “divide and conquer tactics” to exploit racial animosity 
between Hispanics and blacks on Costa Rican banana plantations. By keeping ethnic 
groups separate, he argues, a mixed workforce was prevented from developing solidarity 
or a solidified identity reflecting common challenges.104 
In this part of the discussion, the research of Glidden (2011) is also of relevance. 
In her work, which looks at possible explanations for the lack of ethnic-based mobilizing 
in Peru, she posits that those who have come from the sierra and the selva may have 
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internalized their inferior position in the national ethnic hierarchy. A similar concept is 
described by Bourgois (1989), as he notes that the indigenous workers on Costa Rican 
plantations had internalized a self-depreciation that inhibited their ability to resist 
intimidation or abuse by supervisors.  
The attitudes expressed by workers and company management in Camposol 
tended to lend credence to such notions. In an interview with Camposol representatives, 
they implied that workers from the sierra were well suited by nature to the work in the 
factories. “They are hard workers, and they complain very little,” said Alan. Other 
workers observed that those who had arrived to Camposol through recruitment 
mechanisms were much less likely to speak out or “meterse en problemas” when disputes 





Chapter VI: Labor in the Plantation 
“Derechos hemos siempre tenido; el cumplimiento de ellos es lo que nos hace falta.” 
 
- Jacinto 
The plantation is a well-researched site of capital accumulation, the expression of 
relationships of power, commodification, and labor exploitation. On the nontraditional 
export plantations of La Libertad, raw matter – land, crops, and labor – are transformed 
into capital by the numerous foreign and national agribusinesses who have installed 
operations in the region. Classic class-based struggles, as noted by Walsh and Snyder 
(1979), will forever pit the power elite and corporate chieftains against farmworkers 
while allowing their abundant resources to influence political and other elites.105 
Although Peru is a signatory member to international free trade agreements and 
labor rights conventions that seek to standardize working conditions with local norms and 
practices, a large gap remains between labor rights on the books and labor rights in 
practice. A critical challenge facing many developing countries, including Peru, is how to 
meet international labor standards while maintaining a competitive edge in global 
industries. As is especially true with agribusiness, the speed and efficiency of workers is 
central to the effectiveness of corporations moving perishable crops across vast distances, 
a fact that makes a stable, reliable workforce of central importance to the industry. 
Yet in the data collected for this study, it appeared that the need for an efficient 
and well-disciplined workforce was often achieved in ways that were at odds were basic 
labor rights. Interviews indicated that aggression, sexual harassment, humiliation, 
discrimination against unionized workers, and baseless dismissal from the workplace 
were problems that workers encountered both in the field and the factories on a regular 
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basis. Aggression at the workplace, as discussed by Einarsen and B.I. Raknes (1997), 
interacts with a number of factors that are already playing out between workers and 
management, namely status inequalities and power relationships.106 
As is the case for most if not all workers in the factories and fields of Camposol, 
their employment there is one of the main if not the only source of income for their 
family. Furthermore, their attendance is imperative to job retention. We also know that in 
the region of La Libertad, the abundance of cheap and readily available labor, in addition 
to definite contracting practices, has pushed economically insecure workers to tolerate 
poor working conditions and abusive treatment from management. 
VERBAL HARASSMENT  
Workers reported verbal abuse as the most common form of pressure applied to 
workers in the factory and the field. In both settings, workers are given standards – 
whether a poundage of asparagus in every crate or a number of cans to be sealed every 
minute – that they must uphold in order to maintain their position as an employee.  
As Camilo explains, “In 2003, the management became more aggressive with us – 
we had to produce more, faster, and we had to cover more ground in the fields.” While he 
was relatively young, there were a number of older workers that fell behind. “Some 
workers simply didn’t have the capacity to go any faster.” 
Clara, who worked in the factory before becoming pregnant with her son, 
remembers that being yelled at was commonplace, and that few workers ever responded 
to verbal harassment. “I wanted to remind [the supervisors] that they weren’t working 
with animals,” she said. “They would try to intimidate us, getting close and yelling 
‘advance!’”  
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The necessity to tolerate harassment was a common theme among workers 
describing verbal abuse. “We have all been humiliated,” said Isabel. “But the necessity 
was too great.” She described a manager who consistently tried to ‘break’ her and her 
colleagues. “There was one man – a truly mean man – who used to always say ‘I don’t 
care what happens in your house, the important thing is your production.’” He was the 
manager that eventually drove Isabel to join SITECASA. 
Because the company pays in accordance with Law 27360, the agribusiness 
regimen that does not require companies to pay equal wages to its workers, many 
companies have instated ‘bonus systems’ that rewards workers for packing larger crates 
of asparagus or working more hours in the factory. The verbal harassment and pressure 
that is applied to employees by managers is not only something that workers must learn 
to tolerate but, in accordance with the bonus system, may even result in greater economic 
gains for the workers and, in turn, their managers.  
“I joined SITECASA because I couldn’t stand how the management treated the 
workers,” said Mario, the first registered member of SITECASA. “I started as a 
supervisor, but I didn’t like how enslaved the workers were. We had to yell at them, that 
was part of the job.” 
In 2008, workers reported that the company held a series of workshops with the 
goal of improving relations between workers and their supervisors. “From that point 
forward, they were supposed to stop yelling at us,” said Clara.  Yet workers in 2010 and 
2011 reported that yelling and intimidation practices were still widely practiced by 
supervisors. “The supervisors will yell right on top of you,” said Jacinto. “And nerves can 
be an ugly thing – in front of an authority your nerves can cause you to perform much 
worse.”  
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Intimidation was another tactic described in interviews with several workers. 
Oftentimes supervisors were reported to have made an example out of a particularly slow 
or delinquent worker in hopes that their colleagues would take note and fall into line.  
“I’ve seen grown women crying in the factory,” said Jacinto. “The conditions 
always were that if you say something, you go to your house. The reality of the workers 
has made it so that they are working out of necessity, without access to education, and in 
that way we have no choice but to support these conditions. Our reality is disastrous.”  
In recent years, workers reported that the company has isolated workers in the 
field if they are believed to be problematic.  “They put me far out in the field after I 
complained that my rights were being violated,” said Enrique, a former factory worker 
who had recently joined SITECASA. “After the protests in 2010, the company moved me 
far out into the harvesting fields and had me picking the weeds between the asparagus 
rows,” Mario added. 
Unionized workers also reported being targeted by supervisors for their affiliation 
with SITECASA. While the massive firings associated with union membership are in the 
not-so-distant past, interviews with unionized and non-unionized workers indicated that 
the company has systematic ways of treating unionized workers differently, often times 
using them to dissuade non-unionized workers from affiliating. Clara, whose husband 
was a member of SITECASA before being laid off after the protests in 2005, said 
“Camposol doesn’t treat members of the union equally. Affiliated workers don’t usually 
finish out their contracts.” Furthermore, the treatment of unionized workers by 
supervisors often takes a different tone. Unionized workers are often accused of “not 
wanting to work,” or “trying to cause trouble,” and publicly shamed in front of non-
unionized workers in a manner that, according to SITECASA members, dissuades 
workers from affiliating to the union. 
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Ignacio, who has worked as a maintenance worker in the factory since 2004, said 
that he has witnessed supervisors using union-based threats on numerous occasions. 
“They say things like ‘if you union members don’t want to work, I’ll go talk to my boss 
and he’ll send you home.’”  
WAGES AND HOURS 
Discrepancy in wages and hours are ongoing problems for agribusiness workers 
who claim that companies are highly inconsistent in their allocation of both. Most 
workers interviewed reported earning between 300 and 380 soles ($116 - $147) per two 
weeks, for an average monthly salary of approximately 680 soles ($263). This number 
seems to be slightly higher than those reported in a study by Calisaya and Flores (2006) 
that found most women in the Peruvian asparagus industry to be making approximately 
16 to 18 soles ($6.20 - $7.00) a day, though those numbers were collected four to five 
years before my interviews.107 
Under Law 27360, agricultural workers are due a daily wage between 23 and 26 
soles. This amounts to between 690 and 780 ($265 - $300) soles a month, a number that 
is said to include the CTS and yearly bonuses. The national minimum wage, without CTS 
or yearly bonuses, is set at 675 ($261) soles a month under Legislative Decree 728. For 
common laborers in the private sector, additional sums in CTS and bonuses are paid on 
July 15 and December 15 and amount to a certain percentage of company profits and 
time worked. In the case of being fired, an agricultural worker will be paid approximately 
one-third of the sum paid to workers in other private industries.108 
Furthermore, the hours that agricultural workers can be accumulated and averaged 
over the period of the worker’s labor contract, meaning that there is no legal requirement 
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that the workday be kept to eight hours when a worker can be given consequent days off 
to reach the average of eight per day over the period of the contract. The common labor 
regimen, in contrast, states that only eight hours may be worked on any given day, with 
no more than 48 hours worked in any week and with a limit of 12 overtime hours per 
week. Likewise, a worker under the common labor regime must be paid 25 percent over 
his or her wages for the first two hours of overtime, 35 percent more for any additional 
hours, and 100 percent more if working on a Sunday. 
Health benefits to agricultural workers are also much worse than those enjoyed by 
workers in other sectors. Under Law 27360, agribusinesses only pay four percent of 
health benefits awarded to the worker while the common labor regime requires the 
employer to pay nine. 
INTERFERENCE WITH LABOR ORGANIZING 
This study found that workers – almost unanimously – described working 
conditions that were arduous, that required long hours standing up, performing repeated 
monotonous tasks or bent over, physically toiling under a bright coastal sun. They 
described working hours that were inconsistent, unpredictable, and not always reflected 
accurately in their paycheck. They also described a general desire to be better treated and 
more respected by their supervisors and company managers.  
Yet despite the vast and diverse accounts of discontent among workers, only 850 
are registered members of the company’s only independent union SITECASA. Interviews 
revealed that the company had a number of techniques used in the workplace that acted to 
disincentivize worker participation in organized labor activities. 
Several workers reported receiving a 50 sol ($19) bonus from the company upon 
signing their contract under the condition that they would not join SITECASA. Fernando, 
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when asked why he hadn’t joined the union answered, “If I affiliate with SITECASA, I 
don’t get any benefits. Plus, the guy in human resources told me that the month I signed 
they were giving out 50 sol bonuses for everyone who didn’t join the union.” He added 
that he didn’t know much about the union and hadn’t followed up with any of its 
members. Marcelo, who was 29 and lived with his brother Francisco in El Milagro, also 
reported receiving a 50 sol bonus when he signed his contract after he promised not to 
affiliate with the union. 
The wife of Juan Luís, the owner of El Milagro, was shocked to hear that anyone 
could join the union. “When I joined, they told me I had to work at the company for four 
years before I could affiliate!” 
In more subtle terms, many workers were told either by supervisors or human 
resource representatives that the company would not support them as affiliated members 
of SITECASA. Rumors circulated that once a worker had affiliated, they wouldn’t be 
allowed to enter the workplace. As both unionized and non-unionized workers described, 
the union remained something that many laborers were afraid to be part of, largely 
because of false information that had been circulated or propagated by the company 
itself. As discussed earlier, the general lack of job security makes it difficult for workers 
to take risks in the workplace. 
“No one wants to take the risk of rubbing the company the wrong way,” said 
Marisa. “But what they don’t realize is that the company doesn’t really care about any 
one worker.” 
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SEASONALITY AND JOB SECURITY 
In recent decades, developing countries have increasingly confronted two trends, 
seemingly in opposition: the adoption of international labor standards and the movement 
towards greater market flexibility.109  
A flexible labor force, which generally correlates to lower levels of worker power 
and collective mobilization, has been shown to increase labor fragmentation and erode 
personal security.110 Generally, flexibilization of labor has meant the passing of measures 
that would make it easier for companies to hire and fire a worker, the incorporation of 
women and youth – two groups who have seen less integration into the labor market – 
and the introduction of temporary work contracts. The result for workers has been 
increased labor insecurity. Several authors have argued that the model of flexibilization 
of labor, a consequence of globalization and common to neoliberal policies, has not 
resulted in a betterment of labor conditions for the working class.111112 
A brochure produced by the Regional Commission of La Libertad aiming to 
attract foreign agribusiness to the region, mentions the benefit of the “neutral Spanish 
accent” found in what it calls a “flexible and competitive labor force.”113 
As noted by Ferm (2008), the terms of worker employment in the nontraditional 
agroindustry of Peru is a primary reason for job instability. What companies call 
“descansos temporales” – seasonal layoffs – are part of a package of labor flexibilization 
laws passed through in the Fujimori era that made it easier for companies to let workers 
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go during seasonal production slumps.114 There were two major legislative 
mechanisms signed at this time, Legislative Decree 728 and the Law 25593, which 
eliminated the role of the State as tutor in collective bargaining and liberalized individual 
labor freedoms, respectively.115 While this has increased efficiency for MNCs, who are 
able to hire on a highly available labor force when production is high, it has been at a 
detriment to workers that such policies were implemented.  
One of the primary reasons that jobs in the agroindustry are by definition 
precarious is the inherent seasonality of the work, which prevents consistency in hours 
and wages. Most of the contracts awarded by Camposol and other agribusinesses in the 
region are for three months, subject to renewal or termination depending – officially – on 
the performance of the worker. Under short-term contracts legalized under the labor 
flexibilization model, workers under short-term contract with agribusinesses do not 
receive health insurance, vacation, or social-security coverage. 
“Workers can’t expect to work the entire year,” said Andres, vice-president of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Trujillo. “The company has the obligation to recognize the 
rights of the worker and to pay them for the work that they do. If there’s no work to do, 
they are not going to get paid,” he said, adding that “that’s what happens when you work 
for the State, and we’ve seen how that has worked out.” 
“The nature of the work is cyclical,” said Alan, the director of human resources 
for Camposol, “which means that a lot of workers come and go.” In 2010, he estimated 
that 20 to 25 percent of workers who were hired stayed through the end of the year. 
Referring back to discussions of social networks, these numbers are likely reflective of 
the difficulties incurred by workers who come alone through recruitment practices and 
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have little in the way of support in Chao. The implications of a highly mobile and 
frequently changing labor force presents obvious challenges for labor organizing, 
something that will be discuss further in the next chapter.  
While the inherent connection between agribusiness and fluctuating labor needs is 
undeniable, the company practices appear to some workers to be overtly undermining the 
staying power of long-term employees. “The infuriating thing is, sometimes you will hear 
of a massive layoff only to turn on your radio and hear an advertisement from Camposol 
asking for new workers,” said Camilo. A woman in her 60s who had recently joined 
SITECASA explained that “the companies are accustomed to giving layoffs then 
choosing who comes back in. They wouldn’t receive older women like me.” It was after 
receiving her most recent descanso temporal, that she decided to join SITECASA.  
Alvaro, a 19-year-old worker who had moved with his parents to Chao when he 
was 10, said that he had been laid off, on average, every three months. “After I finished 
high school, I ran out of money to keep studying,” he said. “I went to work in Ica, but the 
work was just seasonal. When I heard an announcement to work for Camposol, I came 
back.” Each time he was laid off, he would simply pass by another company to see if they 
were hiring. “The companies always ask a lot of you, but now it’s normal,” he said, “And 
God willing, they will give me three more months.” 
“Jovencita Soy” 
Flor, who was also 19-years-old, lived on the third floor of El Milagro (see Figure 
). On a small table, a pile of pots and pans were stacked against the bright green walls of 
her 6-foot by 8-foot bedroom. The table partially blocked the entrance to the bathroom 
and was less than a foot from her bed, which was completely covered with clothing, 
kitchenware, Camposol uniforms, fingernail polish, and magazines. She recently bought a 
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two-burner stove with her earnings from Camposol and, now that she had the necessary 
pieces, was going to try to cook more often in her room. She and another young girl that 
had also migrated from the selva slept together in the twin bed, splitting the cost of the 
room to save money. 
The room was adorned with markers of adolescence. On one wall, Flor had 
haphazardly taped the posters of several boy bands, the most prominent being a five-
person South Korean group called “Boys Over Flowers.” She had their DVDs and a 
wallet-sized photo of the band members that she took with her when she left her room. In 
the pile on her bed was the Camposol Annual Report for workers, a glossy publication 
that she hurriedly flipped through as we spoke. She shrieked as she recognized her 
friends in the photos, turning the pamphlet to show me who she worked with. Her room 
Figure 4: Flor in her room at El Milagro. 
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was surrounded by mostly single male workers of a similar age. “The boys here are a lot 
of trouble,” said Flor, something she repeated to me a number of times. She had to avoid 
their gazes and avoid their advances at all costs, she explained. Her goal was getting to 
Lima, where her sister lived, and she didn’t want a relationship with any of the boys in El 
Milagro to keep her from moving on from Camposol. 
“With time, I’m going to save my money,” she said. It was the only thing keeping 
her in a job that she described as tiring and poorly paid. Flor came from La Merced, a 
town of 50,000 in the province of Junín, when she was 13 years old. “I had nothing to do 
during school vacations,” she said. “I wanted to live alone and I didn’t want to be 
dependent on my parents any longer.” 
The first time I met with Flor, she was optimistic about the mobility that her job at 
Camposol would allow her. She had worked there for more than six months at that point, 
and described the work as “bacán,” “excelente,” and said that she thought the treatment 
was “bonito.” She had heard stories about the days of yelling managers, she said, but had 
had no such experience herself. The second time we met, her tone had changed. She had 
slept in the day before and arrived late to work, an error forgiven on few occasions by 
company managers who were known to fire individuals after one late arrival. “If I miss 
again, they’re going to throw me out,” she said, clearly distressed. She was sick, hadn’t 
been sleeping well, and was less willing to describe anything in positive terms. “We have 
to stand all day,” she said. “Your body gets used to it, but sometimes you feel awful like I 
do now.”  
“Things are better overall,” she added. “At least now the workers have rights and 
they can’t yell at us.” When asked about how such conditions related to union activity 
and what she knew of the group SITECASA, she described her decision not to join in 
simple terms: “If you promise the company you won’t support the union, they give you a 
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bonus of 50 soles,” she said. And those 50 soles, she added, are going to get her one step 
closer to Lima, out of Chao, and far away from Camposol. 
Francisco and Marcelo, brothers who lived down the hall from Flor, expressed 
similar feeling towards the company. They were 23 and 29 years old, respectively, and 
had come together from Guadalupe in the province of Chiclayo. They both worked in the 
plant, peeling and canning asparagus. “We’re saving up enough to buy a ticket to leave,” 
said Marcelo. “I don’t want to spend my whole life in a factory.” Although Francisco 
wasn’t sure what he wanted to do, he agreed with his older brother, indicating that he 
would like to start his own business with the money that he had saved at Camposol. 
GENDER AND THE WORKPLACE 
In Peru, approximately 70 percent of the laborers who work in asparagus fields 
are women.116 They comprise the majority of factory workers, too, as many desired skills 
stereotypically assigned to women – fine motor skills, delicateness with monotonous and 
repetitive tasks – are highly sought after in the nontraditional export industry. In La 
Libertad and in the fields and factories of Camposol, the work force is largely feminized.  
Yet the majority of women who enter agribusiness do so at a young age – most 
between 18 and 25 – and without completing their high school education.117 Although my 
research only included interviews with women over the age of 18, there were a number of 
minors working in the plantations with borrowed identification. This fact, along with 
gender discrimination in the workplace, has prevented women from being promoted to 
supervisory positions that would pay better wages and offer better job security. Even after 
decades of experience, such well-established hierarchies prevent women from advancing 
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through the ranks. It is for this same reason that instances of sexual harassment are high 
in both the factories and fields of agribusiness, as most supervisors are men who have 
been tasked with managing a large number of workers who are predominantly women.  
Clara stopped working for Camposol when she became pregnant with her son. 
Now that he has grown, she would like to return to work to supplement her husband’s 
meager wages on another plantation but cannot afford to pay for daycare while she and 
her husband are at work. She remembers that women were often referred to as “faldas” – 
skirts – by their supervisors and that she would overhear managers telling women to 
“move their whore asses.” Another female worker who had worked in the field on and off 
for several years reported that one of her area supervisors had once approached her in an 
isolated corner of a field and asked her to take her clothes off. 
Between 1999 and 2003, Peru passed several laws aiming to protect women 
workers, including the prohibition of firing based on pregnancy and allowing that women 
take breaks for breast-feeding. Yet, as noted by Karim and Flores (2006), many women 
in the nontraditional sector have little experience with salaried employment and are 
unaware of their rights as workers.118 
Though none reported such incidents in recent years, several workers reported 
having seen overt discrimination against pregnant women in the years when the first 
unionizing efforts were oppressed. “If there was a pregnant woman at work that was 
suffering from morning sickness, supervisors would come and tell her to return to her 
house,” said Camilo. “Those days were really sad for everyone. I tried to get the 
supervisor to reconsider, but they threatened to send me home too.” In 2007, the Lima-
based NGO Aurora Vivar took on two legal cases regarding two young women who 
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alleged they had been fired from Camposol when their pregnancies became visible, 
charges that emphasize the ongoing challenges to women in the workplace.  
THE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND POWER-BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE 
Beyond the ethnic lines that have divided laborers between the plant and the 
fields, as discussed in Chapter V, there may be additional factors that explain the vastly 
differing rates of mobilization and unionization among workers in the two working 
environments. 
Field workers explained the process by which they had become aware of and 
eventually affiliated with the union SITECASA as happening organically, most often on 
the job. “You see someone get yelled at, and it makes you sad,” said Camilo. “Then you 
start talking to the people that are working next to you, and they agree that no one should 
be treated that way.” It is in this way – en voz alta – that workers in the field relate are 
able to share their experiences with verbal abuse, pressure, and harassment from their 
superiors. “I was talking to one guy in the field and he said ‘you know what, you should 
join the union’. He told me when the next meeting was and I became a member the next 
week,” said Mario. 
In contrast, workers in the factory report high levels of control exercised by 
managers.  
Jacinto, from Julcán – the sierra – describes the control exerted in the factory in 
the following words: 
 
From the very first day, the labor conditions left me feeling incredibly indignant, 
subject to abuse both psychologically and physically. Once you have entered [the 
factory], you can’t smile, you can’t talk, and you can’t even look side to side 
while you’re working. You can’t do anything. The supervisor manages us all by 
yelling. He’s even made the older women cry. We knew we had the rights, but 
there was nothing to do. 
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Moreover, in a close and tightly monitored environment, workers are more likely 
to be affected by the abusive language used by supervising managers. “One day, our 
manager came and said ‘today heads are going to roll,’ meaning that he was having a bad 
day,” said Isabel. “Everyone was so nervous, thinking their jobs were at risk, and of 
course their production that day was worse than normal.”  
Skott (2010) describes this phenomenon as power-biased technical change 
(PBTC). Referring to the logistical difficulties incurred by large MNCs, he argues that 
“the burdens of coordinating large, complex, geographically dispersed companies 
enhanced the bargaining power of those lower in the hierarchy and reduced that of top 
managers.”119 In other words, technological changes in the workplace affects power 
relationship, allowing managers to better monitor the other workers, effectively lowering 
the organizing capacity of workers looking to protest perceived inequalities. 
The phenomenon may find an application in the discrepancy between the rates of 
unionization among field and factory workers. Currently, more than 85 percent of 
SITECASA members work in the fields. In his research, Skott explains that the power of 
the worker is found to be dependent on two factors: the sensitivity of the company to the 
worker’s actions (can he or she affect a large operation or costly piece of equipment) and 
whether or not the employer is able to effectively constrain the actions of the worker 
through monitoring and intervention.120 Poor information systems, he contends, reduce 
the ability of employees to match output with the effort required for that output, 
increasing worker power and resulting in generally higher wages.121 
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In the case of the field workers, the answer to the whether or not the company is 
able to constrain the actions of the worker is, for most purposes, negative. Field workers 
enjoy a great deal of freedom from managers and, largely because monetary bonuses are 
offered for pounds harvested and not hours spent in the field, the financial success of the 
workers and the company is dependent upon the worker’s productivity. 
Using the same criteria given by Skott, the outcome is quite different when 
applied to the factory workers, who have a high level of supervision at all times. In the 
factories, large groups of low-paid workers work under increased task specification and 
increased monitoring. The risk of increased monitoring, for the workers, is a heightened 
likelihood of being fired should the employer become aware of variations in the workers’ 
‘effort’.122 Thus, the development of technologies that allow employers to monitor their 
workers has made productivity more than an output but a process that can be measured 
over time.  
“In the field is where we’re able to do most of our recruiting,” said Camilo. “In 
the field, we enjoy more freedom, but that’s not the case in the factory.” Speaking about 
the initial work done by SITECASA in the field, he said that very little of it ever reached 
those workers in the factory. “SITECASA began in the field,” he said, “and even though 
the conditions in the factory were just as bad, our efforts never reached them.” 
  
                                                 
122 Ibid., 56. 
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Chapter VII: Labor Unions in La Libertad and the Case of SITECASA  
“Nací digno y moriré digno.” – Julio Escobar 
 
It was from the labor conditions that prevailed in the early years of La Libertad 
agribusiness that the first attempts at organizing among workers would emerged. As Arce 
(2008) describes, the growing disparities among regions within Peru were important in 
framing and forming collective political and union activity. Under neoliberal 
decentralization policies, workers could begin to “territorialize discontent” on their own 
terms.123 
THE EARLY YEARS 
Workers began to realize that once organized, they would likely have much more 
leverage in negotiations with company officials. Early attempts to organize labor in La 
Libertad were met by fierce resistance by agribusiness management and state 
representatives. Two major cases stand out in the history of attempted union organizing 
in La Libertad. The first, that of union leader Julio Escobar, took place in 2002. The 
second, the case of labor advocate Lucía Herrera, would follow in 2004. 
Julio Escobar (see was born in Virú but moved to Lima when he was young. He 
returned to La Libertad in 2002 under financial pressures and with the goal of supporting 
his family that stayed in Lima. He found work in the factory of Camposol and in the same 
year organized a factory-wide walkout in protest of poor working conditions and abusive 
treatment by upper management. The effort was promptly squelched by Camposol, who 
immediately fired Julio and a large number of workers who participated in the walkout. 
The company pressed criminal charges against Julio for damage to private property, a 
case they would eventually lose. While several union members were detained, the local 
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population of Chao was ‘sanctioned’ and a two-year hiring freeze went into effect. Julio’s 
case was taken to the Tribunal de Justicia in Lima, at which time Julio claims that 
company offered to pay him to end what had been a nearly six-year endeavor. “Nací digo 
y moriré digno,” he said in 2011 when describing why he rejected the company’s offer. 
“Dinero honesto es dinero digno.” In 2008, he was reinstated to Camposol. 
The case of Lucía Herrera, a union leader in Sociedad Agricola Virú, took similar 
form. She was also a factory worker who, as a woman, had taken issue with challenges 
that were both general to the working population and specific to the condition of female 
workers. When she organized a protest in 2004, her efforts were met with stiff opposition 
and she was quickly dismissed from the company. It was during her attempts to be 
Figure 5: Julio recruits women for a protest in 2010. 
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reinstated into the company that she received disturbing news from a family friend who 
also worked for Sociedad Agricola Virú. “He told me, ‘There’s a price on your head,’” 
she said during an interview in 2011. “Then he told me, ‘I’m part of the group of men 
that is supposed to kill you, so keep your head down and out of sight until the company 
settles down.’” His confession may have saved her life, but it didn’t keep her away from 
labor organizing for long. She has since been reinstated in Sociedad Agricola Virú, where 
she continues to work as a union leader, running campaigns throughout the region to raise 
awareness among workers, especially women, as to their rights in the field and the 
factory.  
Camilo Aramayo, a factory worker who was the leader of SITECASA between 
2007 and 2011, remembers that noticeable pressure on workers began to mount in 2003. 
“We were pushed to work faster, to produce more, to be more efficient,” he said. It was 
in 2004 that he and approximately 40 other workers met with a labor lawyer to discuss 
the possibility of forming a union to protect themselves against exploitation. In 2004, 
Peruvian law required that half or more of the workers in a given company needed join as 
union affiliates in order for the organization to be officially recognized.  
When the company caught wind of the meeting, they fired Florentino Juarez, the 
worker who at the time appeared poised to become the leader of the union and, according 
to Aramayo, the company asked other workers to promise to “disassociate themselves 
from those people.” After Florentino was fired, Aramayo was the next in the line of fire. 
“I was given a descanso temporal, the company claiming that there had been a sudden 
downturn in production.” It was shortly after being let go that Aramayo heard a radio 
announcement asking that workers present themselves for employment in Camposol and 
he decided to take action. He filed complaints with the company and with the Regional 
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Ministry of Labor and was eventually readmitted to work in the factory in 2007. It was 
shortly thereafter that he organized a general strike. 
It was during 2007 that the most aggressive demonstrations and the fiercest 
resistance from Camposol representatives would play out on the streets of Chao. When 
SITECASA members began to strike in July of 2007, the union had 800 officially 
registered members. The reaction of the company was swift. As union member Mario 
described it, “The company said that any union member who wanted to sign for their 
paycheck had to also sign their resignation from the company. In one day, we lost about 
300 members.” Aramayo also remembers the day well. “The strongest ones refused to 
sign,” he said. “But the union was rendered weak that day.” Despite renouncing the act to 
local and national media outlets, there was no press that covered the event.  
Nevertheless, SITECASA moved forward. In August, the union received news 
that its application for official recognition by the Regional Ministry of Labor was 
accepted. This came in the midst of ongoing pressure from the company offering 
monetary incentives for those workers who would voluntarily disassociate themselves 
from the union. Yet on the 29th of September, Noticias Financieras out of Miami 
reported that more than 800 people gathered in the Plaza de Armas in Chao to recognize 
the first three unions in the northern Peruvian agribusiness representing workers from 
Camposol, Ecus SAC, and Talsa. “It was worth the fight,” said Aramayo, quoted in the 
article. “Our dreams have finally become a reality.”124 The company immediately 
responded by forming two in-house unions for management and paid union workers that 
they have used to wager leverage in collective negotiations.  
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While the gathering represented a symbolic advancement in what workers hoped 
were changing attitudes towards labor rights, Camposol continued to systematically 
violate these rights in the months that followed. In December 2007, the company fired 
another 385 workers, according to a report filed to the Tribunal de los Pueblos a las 
Transnacionales Europeas y su actuación en América Latina y el Caribe in 2008. Of the 
workers that were fired in December, 80 percent were registered members of 
SITECASA. In addition to massive layoffs, there were numerous reported acts of 
aggression, kidnappings, and death threats committed against unionized workers. 
Attached to the report were photos (and x-ray images) documenting the wounds incurred 
by SITECASA members when security guards at Camposol attempted to repress 
protestors.125 
In January of 2008, 400 SITECASA members went on strike for 48 hours to 
protest the firing of unionized workers. The Camposol human resources manager claimed 
that the workers were “inefficient,” further stating that “Here we don’t care if they’re 
unionized or not.” He also disputed the numbers reported by SITECASA, claiming that 
only 20 percent of those fired were registered members.126 Despite earning the attention 
of the Regional Ministry of Labor, who collected information and organized a meeting to 
discuss the firings, only 50 workers would eventually be reinstated to the company. 
Later that same month, the leader of the national union CGTP, Mario Huamán, 
claimed that 2,342 unionized workers had been fired from the private sector and 1,085 
from the public sector in clear violation of their right to organize. “It is unfortunate that 
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nothing has been done and that things have grown worse, as is evidenced by the firings in 
Camposol,” he said.127 
THE PROTESTS OF 2010 
The rocky beginnings of SITECASA, officially recognized by the Regional 
Ministry of Labor in 2007, are still reflected in the ongoing negotiations between workers 
and the Company. In 2010, another series of violent protests would surface, eventually 
landing SITECASA workers at the Ministry of Labor in Lima. 
On October 15, 2010, another protest began. The Regional Ministry of Labor 
determined that SITECASA affiliated workers had effectively paralyzed operations in 
violation of their contracts. All protesting workers were banned from entering Camposol 
the next day. The following day, seven of the SITECASA members that were leading the 
protest returned to work, claiming that their period of suspension had ended. Two of them 
were members of the SITECASA directive board. Each was given a carta notarial, 
outlining their dismissal from the company. 
“We were ready to close down the Panamericana,” said Mario, a SITECASA 
member. “As workers, we felt defeated.” 
An emergency meeting was called and SITECASA members began a protest in 
the city of Chao asking for the reinstatement of the seven dismissed SITECASA 
members. The company refused to negotiate and SITECASA relocated its protest to 
Trujillo, outside the Regional Ministry of Labor. It was there that leaders would 
participate in a number of news conferences denouncing what they called a continual 
disrespect for labor rights in Camposol.  
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For nearly 15 days the workers of SITECASA sat in protest, foregoing wages 
while many slept through the nights on the streets of Trujillo. The women collaborated to 
prepare una olla común, food that would fuel the ongoing protests. “The oldest and most 
committed members came out,” said Mario. 
On October 27, an emailed communication from SITECASA members asked for 
the support of the international media: “Estamos tratando de hacer llegar a los medios de 
comunicación, a los Srs. y Sras. Congresistas, a las asociaciones de empresarios que 
importan nuestros productos en el extranjero y a muchas instituciones hermanas de 
nuestra patria.” It is urgent, they said.  The members of the second and third largest 
unions in La Libertad agribusiness, SITESAV (from Sociedad Agricola Virú) and 
TALSA, had also joined the cause. Attached to the email were several photos of women 
who had suffered perforations from bullets fired by security guards and men showing 
hemorrhages resulting from sticks that had been used to beat protestors back. 
The demands made by SITECASA workers, and the terms by which they would 
end the protest, were the following:128 
 
That the seven fired members of SITECASA be reinstated. 
That the weighing of asparagus crates in the field be done in the presence of 
workers.  
That workers be given working tools in accordance with technical specifications. 
That workers be given decent and appropriate work clothes. 
That the quality of worker transportation improve. 
That the company respect the eight-hour workday in the factory and the field.   
That the vehicles taking workers to and from the plantations be punctual. 
In the same news release, they added that “All workers are tired of so much 
abuse, of bad working conditions and misery (attached are photos of our houses), 
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working at a company that gives millions to its owners who live like kings.”129 While the 
company refused to enter into dialogue, SITECASA noted that busloads of new laborers 
had been arriving to Camposol to replace the protestors. On the 25th of October, La 
República quoted a company official stating that the majority of its workers were coming 
to work in a “clear manifestation of their desire to keep working in peace.”130 
While SITECASA renounced the absence of company representatives in a 
dialogue before the Regional Ministry of Labor, the company insisted that it was 
SITECASA that was uncooperative in attempts to schedule meetings. On the 28th of 
October, the case was taken by the Ministry of Labor in Lima. Leaders of SITECASA 
went to negotiate with company representatives in a process mediated by Ministry 
officials.  
A day later, a deal was struck. Two primary concessions were granted on behalf 
of the company. First, the company agreed to install 10 manual scales in the field and that 
both workers and company representatives would be present at the time the crates were 
weighed in order to avoid the irregularities that had been reflected in lower pay to 
workers. 
In a decision that would later be described as controversial by both workers and 
those giving legal counsel to SITECASA, Camposol agreed to readmit two of the seven 
that were fired in the protests. The two men were both leaders of SITECASA. As seen in 
the coming description of failed SITECASA negotiations in June of 2010, this wasn’t the 
first time that union leaders had been privileged at the cost of the base.  
Pablo Cuba, a labor lawyer that has worked for more than 22 years in the region 
and has counseled SITECASA since its formation, saw the decision as problematic. 
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“They should have let those that formed part of the base enter instead of reentering work 
themselves as union leaders,” he said. “They don’t see it as problematic, but it sends the 
wrong message to the company. Los trabajadores [de base] siguen bailando solos.”   
In an interview with company representatives in 2011, a human resources 
representative emphasized Camposol’s commitment to union organization and the 
freedom of association: “We always tell them about the unions when they arrive, and the 
fact that SITECASA has continued to grow over the years is evidence that we have not 
been impeding their activity!” 
The Fall of Camilo 
The night after collective negotiations between Camposol and SITECASA fell 
apart in the wee hours of the morning behind closed doors, Jorge waited for me on the 
curb in from of Pollos Galácticos, a restaurant on the Chao stretch of the Panamericana. 
The base of SITECASA, which was estimated at roughly 750 members in June of 2010, 
had called an emergency meeting of all members – una asamblea general – demanding 
an explanation of the board members who allowed negotiations to fall apart the night 
before.  
Jorge is at this time on leave from the company, under accusations and a pending 
lawsuit alleging that he battered a company guard who was notoriously anti-union. After 
exchanging formalities, it became clear that the failed negotiations the night before were 
upsetting him still. “I can’t believe this happened,” he said, “After everything that we’ve 
worked for these past years.” 
The day before, a Friday, the Regional Ministry of Labor had declared the general 
strike planned by SITECASA to be legal, meaning that no repercussions could be taken 
by the company against workers participating in the strike. The strike, which was planned 
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for Saturday morning, appeared to have broad support. In the three years since the union 
had formed, negotiators for SITECASA had never been in such a well-supported 
position: hundreds of workers were prepared to walk out of Camposol fields and factories 
on Saturday in the middle of high production season. Even the most vulnerable of day 
laborers, those who had been in the company for relatively little time or had the most 
children to feed, had signed on, collectively overcoming the relatively weak positions that 
workers hold as individuals.  
At 1am on Saturday morning, a group of at least 50 workers gather around a table 
behind the bus station where SITECASA met on Fridays waiting for news from Camilo, 
who along with the other board members was at the negotiating table with Camposol in 
Trujillo (see Figure 5) The negotiations process was messy. Camilo, 100 kilometers 
away, was talking through each step of the negotiations with Jorge, who would then relay 
Camilo’s comments to the crowd of workers. From the back of the crowd, it was nearly 
impossible to tell what was being said. “He thinks he’s got to fold,” I heard at one point. 
“They’re offering to let him off the hook.” The crowd yelled, angrily gestured, and after a 
couple more rounds of relayed messages to and from Trujillo, it was over: Camilo had 
forfeited a raise in minimum wage to have Camposol drop all charges against him. 
A year earlier, Camilo was charged with defamation by Camposol for having 
spoken out against the company in the press. They were charges that he and his wife had 
been fighting with some help from the union, but the case had taken its toll financially 
and emotionally on their entire family. In addition to signing away their request for an 
increase in minimum wage, he had also signed away their right to strike the following 
day. 
Arriving at the SITECASA locale, a small opening in a string of building between 
Chao and Virú known as San José, a large crowd had gathering awaiting Camilo’s 
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explanation. Many workers who were unaware of the agreement that Camilo had struck 
at 1am had not gone to work that Saturday morning, as per the conditions of the strike 
agreed upon by SITECASA leaders. Because their right to strike had been signed away in 
the wee hours of that same morning, they were not excused from the day of work they 
had missed.  
The workers were still dressed in torn soccer jerseys, old t-shirts strung around 
their head to protect them from the mid-day sun. Their children were with them, crying, 
nursing, and irritable. Most faces were grim, soiled with dirt from a long day's work and 
chewing through the news that not a single point of negotiation from the night before had 
been met.   
Figure 5: Jorge, holding his cell phone, tries to guide Camilo through negotiations with 
Camposol representatives. 
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I could hear a group of men near me exchanging comments: “He failed all of us.” 
“The company must have paid him off.” “Everything he gained was for him.” “What will 
we do now? We can't strike and we have no chance of negotiating.” 
Camilo took the microphone and the crowd grew silent. He looked terrified and 
absolutely exhausted. While he fumbled with the microphone, the crowd took advantage 
and began to release their tension. "We put all our faith in you!" one man yelled. "What 
will you say to my children!?" "How much did they pay you to stab us in the back?"  
After gazing out over the crowd for some time, finally he spoke. “I've committed 
the biggest mistake of my life,” he said. “The decision as to whether or not I continue in 
my position as the leader of this union is up to you. You will all decide my fate.” Then he 
started crying. He described a life full of terror, in which every day he had arrived home 
to find a newly printed demanda from the company and a plazo in which he had to 
answer. Living his life between demands had ruined, him, he explained. “I can hardly 
think, let alone live.”  
“Remember when you didn't think forming a union was your right? Remember 
when you didn't have a voice?” he asked. “I know I've failed you … it's come to this 
extreme, but we're not done!” he said, pausing to wipe his tears. The crowd softened a 
bit, and an older man from the crowd offered encouragement. “Fuerza!” he yelled. 
"There's no shame here!"  
The crowd grew silent, some still wiping their own tears from their cheeks while 
others continued to mumble their discontent. “Send Julio up to the microphone,” 
someone yelled. Julio, the union organizer who had been blacklisted for eight years after 
staging the first successful protest at Camposol, stood up. The night before, he had tried 
to sway Camilo over the phone while he was in negotiations. “Don't you see what they're 
doing?” he had asked. “If we don't assert our rights, our children will be in this same 
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place! Slaves, just like us!” He had paced angrily while yelling into the phone. “Don't 
sign away everything we've worked for!” 
And now, standing before the crowd, he embodied any remaining strength the 
workers had. He expressed his deep respect for everyone in the union, for the negotiating 
team and everything that they had all, together, achieved over the course of two years. 
“To be stupid is one thing,” he said calmly, “but to be just plain silly, is another.” 
Looking to Camilo, he said “With all respect, you never should have signed that act, 
shouldn't have even been close.” And with that, his mood grew visible worse. Julio 
pushed his way off the stage, handing the microphone to Camilo. As Julio left, so too did 
the workers, grumbling and lifting up their soiled hats to scratch their heads.  
THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF SITECASA 
In the scene described above, Camilo attempts to explain how he was victimized 
by the company, and how such pressure forced him to make a decision at the cost of the 
majority of workers. Giving up gains for the base in the name of individual forgiveness is 
not something unique to this scenario, though this was perhaps the biggest opportunity 
lost to personal gain.  
Originally, the rules of SITECASA prohibited any worker who had either been or 
currently was involved in a lawsuit concerning the company from taking a position on the 
SITECASA board of directors. The reason was simple: they wanted to avoid any 
conflicts of interest that could compromise the goals of the union. Yet in the year before 
the negotiations outlined above, Camilo – with the support of the CGTP – changed the 
union’s statute to allow those with pending lawsuits to hold positions of authority within 
the union. 
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The risk in doing so becomes evident in the scenario discussed above, where 
company representatives were able to offer Camilo and his family ‘freedom’ from a 
traumatic situation that they themselves had imposed. The possibilities for manipulation 
were high, and the loss came at the cost of all union members. A similar scenario pitting 
union leaders against the base played out in the fall of 2010, when of the seven 
SITECASA members that had been dismissed from Camposol only the two union leaders 
were resubmitted following negotiations. 
The union was not exempt from hierarchies of power or suspicion of corruption, 
and through the interviews it became apparent that there were high levels of distrust in 
union leaders among some members of SITECASA’s base. As time went on, suspicions 
grew among union members that Camilo had been “bought” by the company. In 2011, 
Julio, the union leader who denounced Camilo onstage in the post-negotiations union 
meeting, formed a ticket to challenge Camilo in upcoming union board elections. Among 
Julio’s critiques of Camilo, which were shared by many workers, was the suspicion that 
Camilo was receiving money not only from the company but also from CGTP, the 
national worker’s union that many claimed had given poor guidance the night that 
Camilo folded in negotiations. Although Julio had originally forgiven Camilo’s 
misgivings the night of the negotiations, he was worried that the union was losing its 
credibility and the very integrity that he had originally fought to uphold in 2002.  
“I saved him from a lynching that night,” said Julio, referring to the scene above. 
“But he didn’t value that support and now we need to move away from the influences of 
the CGTP to ethnical leadership in SITECASA.” On the night of August 6, 2011, Julio 
and his ticket were elected to the board.  
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Chapter VIII: Limits to Resistance and Conclusions 
Currently, the union has approximately 800 members, though only 400-500 come 
to the large asambleas generales on a regular basis. Of these 800 members, only 300 are 
women, despite representing an overwhelming majority in both the field and the factory. 
More than 85 percent of SITECASA members work in the field as opposed to the factory. 
To date, the achievements that SITECASA members list are the lowering of the 
minimum weight of a loaded asparagus crate from 110 to 85 kilograms, an achievement 
that came at the end of 2007. At the same time, the company agreed to an eight-hour 
work day and to provide tools to workers. In 2008, the company implemented a system of 
incentivizing bonuses for high producing workers, and in the wake of the failed 2010 
negotiations, every SITECASA worker got a bonus of 50 soles or, as one worker put it, 
“a new pair of pants.” 
As Camilo stated in the weeks leading up to the elections of August 6, “It’s still 
the minimum wage that we haven’t been able to touch – and that it what we need to get 
next.”  
In its five years in existence, the closest that workers came to the critical mass and 
support that would have been necessary to increase the minimum wage was during the 
negotiations of June 2010. And while the events that unfolded that night are telling of 
several problems that continue to impede progress among unionized members, this study 
has found that the hurdles to effective organization in La Libertad agribusiness were 
numerous, complicated, and, as evidenced in the text above, deeply rooted in the social, 
political, and economic context of the local communities described there.  
Historically, union activity in Peru has been oppressed by private and state actors 
while union members have been aggressively dismissed from the workplace and, in 
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several cases, kept from finding employment in the same sector or industry. Although 
Peru has enacted a number of labor reforms that have lessened the effects of anti-labor 
laws passed by Fujimori in the 1990s, unions continue to be a controversial subject 
among some sectors in Peru.  It is undeniable that the difficulties faced by union 
organizers in the past continue to inform workers’ sense of security when choosing union 
affiliation as an effective means to achieving goals. 
On the macro-level, there continues to be a large disconnect between the 
international labor conventions and the labor stipulations laid out in free trade agreement 
signed by the government of Peru and the expression of these rights in concrete contexts. 
The dispute mechanisms that have been built into the PTPA, signed between the United 
States and Peru, have not been used by a single private union in Peru despite labor rights 
being awarded the same right to dispute resolution as private investments in the trade 
agreement.  
There are several reasons this may be the case. First, through the interviews it 
became clear that few union members understood the PTPA to be an instrument that 
related to labor rights in any significant way. Of the SITECASA members I spoke with, 
only one was aware of the labor obligations of the Peruvian government under the PTPA. 
While a general lack of knowledge of the international labor rights included in the PTPA 
– or the right to the report the violation thereof – may be a primary reason why no labor 
disputes have been taken through such dispute mechanisms, the scale of impact of the 
union may also play a role.  
During negotiations of the PTPA with Peru, the CGTP protested in the streets of 
Lima. At the time that the PTPA was being rewritten to include modifications to the labor 
and environmental chapters as outlined in Chapter III, SITECASA was still struggling to 
form. That said, it was only the large national labor unions that spoke out in opposition to 
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the PTPA. There was little activity from industry-specific or company-specific unions in 
the years preceding its ratification. It is likely that while unions such as SITECASA had a 
clear stake in the passing of the PTPA, the CGTP, which is more visible, urban, and has 
access to more resources, was able to mount more substantial manifestation of opposition 
than a smaller, individual union would have been able to. 
In addition, the new SITECASA leadership expressed discontent with the way 
that their relationship with the CGTP had developed, citing them as frequently misguided 
and out of touch with the challenges faced by SITECASA members. Moving forward, it 
may be the case that individual or industry-specific unions would have more success – 
and greater accuracy – when mounting labor claims specific to a company or region. As 
evidenced by labor disputes in Guatemala that are pending resolved through mechanisms 
outlined in the Central American Free Trade Agreement, it may also be beneficial for 
Peruvian unions – again, on the company or industry level – to make alliances with 
American unions with similar goals and concerns. In this case, it was the AFL-CIO that 
partnered with Guatemalan unions to bring the labor dispute to arbitration. 
On the micro-level, there are several factors that have limited union organizing, 
some more discrete than others. In the most basic sense, geography has effectively 
limited the visibility of the challenges that plague the workers in Camposol and other 
plantations throughout the arid, empty coast of La Libertad. A 1912 newspaper clipping 
from the Peruano reflects the perceived distance of northern plantations from the 
decision making processes centered in Lima:  
 
In these first days of the month of April, telegraphic dispatches from the Prefect 
of La Libertad announce to the Government that a formidable strike has been 
produced in the haciendas of the Casa Grande in the valley of Chicama. From its 
beginnings, the movement has been characterized by violence that threatens this 
rich agricultural zone and the city of Trujillo. Given the distance and the rapidness 
of the events the central authority had to send, without haste, line troops that 
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would assure the conservation of order disturbed by the striking workers. At the 
same time, ordered was the investigation of the causes of the strike and that the 
leaders of the movement form their requests and, if necessary, that their transfer 
to Lima be arranged so that they could converse directly with the Government and 
with the representatives of Casa Grande. The measures adopted by the 
administrative authorities managed to control the situation by the end of April … 
and in order to prevent new conflicts from emerging, doctor Felipe de Osma has 
been sent to study the land, all that has occurred, with the end of uncovering 
efficient means by which the interests of capitalist workers in the sugar fields of 
La Libertad may be permanently harmonized. 
 
While sending workers to Lima, more than eight hours from La Libertad by bus, 
may seem an excessive measure in the resolution of a labor dispute, both Julio – when 
being reinstated into the company after six years on the blacklist – and the seven workers 
fired in 2010 found resolution only after taking their complaints to the higher 
governmental ranks in Lima. By and large, the conflicts engaged by the members of 
SITECASA and the resulting protests have gone unseen by a large metropolitan 
population that may be able to apply additional pressure in encouraging authorities to 
resolve public displays of discontent.  
Although the physical geography of La Libertad may play a role in isolating labor 
movements of the northern coast, the geographical origins and migration paths of 
workers appear to also have an impact on union involvement. Interviews and 
observations indicated that those workers who came through social networks – kin or 
community connections – were much more likely to stay in La Libertad and form a home 
and eventually bring other members of their immediate or extended family. As an 
extension, these workers were more likely to call the region ‘home,’ insofar as they made 
infrequent visits to their place of origin once they had reunited a significant portion of 
their family in La Libertad.  
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As Duncan and Ley (1993) describe, “place is more than an ‘object.’ Concrete, 
everyday practices give rise to a cultural mediation or ‘structure of feeling’.”131 As 
migrants who came through social networks settled into the area, their sense of place was 
altered, giving workers a greater sense of belonging and pride. Such feelings, I would 
argue, extended into their desire to defend that space and to protect the dignity of those 
workers within it. Of the SITECASA members interviewed, almost all had lived and 
worked in the zone for many years. 
As affiliation to the union was one of the major challenges identified by union 
members, it is important to understand why more workers don’t affiliate, beginning with 
their mode of introduction into the region. There are several factors that appeared to limit 
the participation of workers who were recruited from more rural provinces in the Andes 
and the Amazon.  
The first factor, which acts as the counterpart to the argument presented above, is 
the fact that most workers recruited from neighboring provinces are young and single. 
While some of them find partners and establish families in the region, the experience is 
much more likely to be transitory for those who do not have social networks in the region 
that support them. Because wages, contracts, and hours are pinned in a volatile manner to 
production and international market swings, job security is low. Without social capital to 
lean on, many single workers were quick to move on to Lima or another company. The 
general tendency of recruited workers to leave agribusiness shortly after they arrived 
made them a difficult population to target for union affiliation. Their ties to the region 
were limited and their commitment to improving working conditions was low, as they 
were not looking to support a family or settle down.  
                                                 
131 James S. Duncan and David Ley, Place (Psychology Press, 1993), 263. 
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A factor that further complicated this tendency was the relegation of recruited 
workers to factory jobs, and here the challenge is two-fold. By assigning immigrant 
workers to factory jobs, the company had overtly divided into labor force along lines of 
origin which, although an imperfect indicator, are correlated to ethnicity. This allowed 
for a segregation of the workforce between those workers who were more invested in the 
region and better informed as to their labor rights and those recently arriving and 
atomized workers with little knowledge of the region or the functioning of the company. 
In this way, recruitment opportunities were limited, as those working in the factories 
were doing so alongside fellow newcomers to the region. Moreover, this division was at 
least partially informed by perceived ethnic differences – such as the idea that those 
workers from the Andes or the Amazon are more agreeable or harder workers – which 
risks further promoting ethnic stereotypes and limiting workers with diverse task 
specifications from joining forces in solidarity or creating a unified sense of identity. As 
outlined by Glidden (2011), the internalized sense of inferiority among rural indigenous 
Peruvians may further serve to oppress labor organizing when workers brought from the 
Andes and Amazon are kept apart from a diverse group of workers with which they could 
join in a class, not ethnicity-based movement. 
A third factor involves the employment of technology in the workplace. The 
highly-controlled factory environment creates an inherent challenge for workers looking 
to exert their value within the constraints of company surveillance. As indicated by Skott 
(2010), the power of a worker is dependent upon the company’s sensitivity to his or her 
actions and the ability of the company to effectively constrain his or her actions through 
monitoring or intervention. His conclusions appear to play a partial role in the recruiting 
challenges faced by SITECASA members when looking to attract factory workers in a 
highly controlled environment. The freedom afforded by the large, open fields, in 
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contrast, provide ample opportunity for workers to discuss common frustrations and 
possible solutions through organization. 
Finally, the internal dynamics of the union are an important challenge that has 
impaired the progress of SITECASA in recent years. Accusations of corruption and 
selfishness have undermined the once-stable base of solidarity. After numerous 
negotiations have resulted in a loss for the base and a gain for one or two union leaders, 
questions of loyalty and transparency have caused many workers to disaffiliate from the 
union. “When there is no transparency, there will be no gains,” said Daniela. “The 
workers aren’t convinced with the current administration, and why would new members 
affiliate if there are no gains to show for it.” As Scott (1990) notes, the infrapolitics of 
subordinate groups prescribe behavior in which no members of the group should rise 
above the level of the base. Yet power dynamics, as seen in the case of Camilo and the 
two rehired union leaders, surface when stakes are personal.132 
On a broad scale, a question that deserves more research is why in an industry 
dominated by women are only 35 percent of SITECASA’s members female. Historically, 
gender differences in occupational structures have been higher in Latin America than in 
other regions of the world, Peru being comparable to the rest of the region.133 Known 
challenges to women in the workplace, such as the idea that a working women is doubly 
bound to earning money for her family and acting as the caretaker in the house, are likely 
the same factors that have limited the participation of women in unions such as 
SITECASA. As women have on multiple occasions reported being dismissed from 
agribusinesses during pregnancy, the forced absence of women workers who leave for 
                                                 
132 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 183. 
133 M. Moreno et al., “Gender and Racial Discrimination in Hiring: A Pseudo Audit Study for Three Selected Occupations in 
Metropolitan Lima” (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=491623. 
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maternity-related reasons would further challenge their ability to participate in union 
activities.  
In summary, there are a number of interacting factors that appear to predict union 
involvement in SITECASA, the only independent union of Camposol. First, historical 
and legal frameworks have challenged the ability of union workers to organize freely and 
exercise their rights to expression and association. Secondly, the mode by which workers 
arrive to Camposol seems to predict their permanence in the region and their place of 
work. Recruitment practices propagate ethnic divisions of labor that exploit national 
social hierarchies that are further complicated by high levels of supervision and low 
levels of freedom. Finally, the vulnerability of union leaders to corruption or selfish acts 
against the interest of the base has led to a deterioration of union morale. Women, who 
represent the majority of the working population, are underrepresented in SITECASA 
due to factors that likely have as much to do with their reproductive capacity as their 
historical gender roles as formulated by Peruvian society. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Looking forward, the limited power of workers in globalized spaces of production 
continues to be a central question challenging the tenets of neoliberal policies worldwide. 
While economic reforms and their distributive effects have created winners and losers, it 
is important to take a critical look at who benefits from neoliberalization and to what 
extent those who don’t benefit are being compensated or neutralized by the State. Moving 
forward, it will be necessary to analyze the actors that are setting the rules of the game 
and deciding the extent to which corporate and free market interests are able to dominate 
political and economic agendas that have exacted severe social costs, in many cases, on 
the most vulnerable sectors of society.  
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Conflict and class-based domination are primordial conditions that have long 
defined the relationship between capital and labor. As neoliberal reforms have the effect 
of economically transforming and rearranging Peruvian society, it is natural that those 
who find themselves as losers in the new economic framework will resist with all the 
tools at their disposal. In the case of SITECASA and Peruvian agribusiness, the question 
is not whether or not there should be conflict but what tools are available to labor unions 
as they enter into negotiations with the State and private investors. In order to improve 
the participation of unions in the redefinition of labor relations under an economic 
framework that has displaced many low-skilled workers, Peru must do a better job of 
guaranteeing the basic rights outlined in the several international agreements to which it 
is a signatory member. Although this study acknowledges that Peru has taken several 
legal steps in assuring the right of workers to the freedom of association and the right to 
organize, we see in the chapters above that there are a number of tangible and well-
documented impasses to the effective participation of unions in the remodeling of labor 
relations. 
The touted benefits of liberalized trade for labor throughout Latin American 
include an increased transparency of operations that would, in theory, shed a critical light 
on poor labor conditions and expose them to the demands of global consumers 
increasingly concerned with the social and environmental impacts of their food. The Peru 
Trade Promotion Act (PTPA) has gone further than any other U.S. free trade agreement 
in providing protective language and dispute resolutions mechanisms for labor. The 
general assumption among those in favor of trade liberalization is that labor will benefit 
from the abundance of jobs that free trade creates, particularly in the unskilled labor 
sector. It is further presumed that the capital flowing into countries such as Peru will 
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ultimately even the lowest economic rungs of society through state spending and private 
investment that creates additional employment.  
And although levels of employment are considered a basic determinant of overall 
economic and as a result social welfare, especially in countries where the social 
protections are weak, one of the central criticisms of liberalized trade concerns is the 
quality and stability of the employment created. One aspect of this criticism is the fact 
that developing countries often promote low-tech industries in which they have 
comparative advantage – such as the case of nontraditional exports – instead of focusing 
on more dynamic, technologically-driven sectors. As a result, liberalizing policies may 
have the effect of de-industrializing a developing country and maintaining workers in 
poorly paid and insecure positions of employment. 
In any case, serious questions remain as to whether or not free trade as a model 
for economic development and improved labor conditions is a promise that has yet to be 
fully realized in the country of Peru or if such promises have, across Latin American 
contexts, been largely a farce. The case of SITECASA and Peruvian agribusiness 
presents several important factors that have limited the effective organizing of labor 
unions within a national framework of trade liberalization and a local context of regional 
inequalities, internal migration, and geographic particularities. This study echoes the call 
that further research be done to better establish the role and responsibility of corporate 
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